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The UN-Blessed MSS Could be the First Step Toward a Decade-Long U.S. Military Occupation of Haiti

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A Kenyan policeman stomping on a prone demonstrator in Nairobi in 2016. Credit: Ben Curtis/AP Photo

(Français)

On Mon., Oct. 2, 2023, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2699 authorizing a non-UN Multinational Security Support (MSS) force for Haiti. The resolution, adopted under UN Charter’s Chapter VII, was drafted by the United States and Ecuador. This Resolution represents the successful implementation of phase one Washington’s “10-Year Strategy for Haiti.” An U.S.-led invasion and 10 year occupation of Haiti is now imminent.

Phase two of the “10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti” was implemented in the summer of 2023. Phase two seeks to build a network of at least 250 U.S.-funded “civil society” organizations to influence public policy and decision-making as Washington oversees the reconstruction of Haiti’s state institutions and government.

The consequences of Washington’s “10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti” would be comparable to the 1915 American invasion and occupation of Haiti. If Washington gets its way, Haiti will turn from its current status as a U.S. neo-colony back into a virtual colony, as it was under U.S. Marine rule from 1915 to 1934.

Washington’s Global Fragility Act

Passed with full bipartisan support under President Donald Trump in 2019, the Global Fragility Act (GFA) was initially framed by proponents as an “an opportunity to drive the necessary change” to prevent “adversaries such as China and Russia to expand their influence.”

The U.S. government selected Haiti to be the first “partner” under the GFA. Also on the list are Libya, Mozambique, and Papua New Guinea, along with West Africa’s Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo.

Kenyan Foreign Minister Alfred Mutua estimates “that the [MSS] project would take three years and require from 10,000 to 20,000 personnel.”

The GFA follows the “2017 National Security Strategy” that will work to “strengthen” so-called “fragile states… where state weakness or failure would magnify threats to the American homeland.”

The GFA aims to prevent “fragile states” from developing diplomatic and trade relationships with Russia and China. In a 2021 speech, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken described China as “the only country with the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to seriously challenge the stable and open international system – all the rules, values, and relationships that make the world work the way we want it to.”

This adversarial stance on China results from its rapprochement with “fragile states” which involves geo-strategic concerns, including access to raw materials.

In a major policy speech in Seoul in 2022, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen explained that the U.S. “cannot allow countries like China to use their market position in key raw materials, technologies, or products to disrupt our economy and exercise unwanted geopolitical leverage.”

Haiti has mineral resources, primarily gold, valued at an estimated US$20 billion. It is unclear, however, whether these mineral resources can be extracted at a profit.

Washington also wants to prevent Haiti from developing closer diplomatic relations and economic ties with Russia. Jovenel Moïse, who was assassinated two years ago, established formal diplomatic relations with Moscow only one month before his assassination, accrediting Russian ambassador Sergey Melik-Bagdasarov. It was the first time Haiti had established diplomatic relations with Russia. Many argue that this could have been a factor which led Washington to green-light Moïse’s assassination.

Meanwhile, Haiti remains one of only 11 nations (not counting the Vatican) out of 193 worldwide which recognize Taiwan as an independent nation, the so-called “Republic of China.” The People’s Republic of China has sought to woo Haiti to drop Taiwan and formally establish diplomatic relations with it, just as the neighboring Dominican Republic did in 2018.

Kenyan cops in their purple riot gear.

A “partnership” under the GFA between Haiti and Washington would ensure that Haiti remains under U.S. hegemony for decades. This would also block diplomacy and investment from countries like China. In 2017, China offered to overhaul Port-au-Prince’s crumbling infrastructure with a US$4.7 billion aid package if Haiti would recognize it and join its “One Belt, One Road Initiative.”

So far that hasn’t happened, and the GFA aims to keep things that way. It is a plan to maintain global hegemony and gather former colonies and neo-colonies under its wing.

It is no wonder that Washington chose Haiti as its first “partner” under the GFA. Haiti is often the laboratory where Washington tests its new imperialist strategies for maintaining hegemony.

Washington’s “10-Year Security Assistance” Program

 The GFA emphasizes building relationships with “local civil society” by “strengthen[ing] the capacity of the United States to be an effective leader of international efforts to prevent extremism and violent conflict.”

This “capacity” also includes 10-year “planned security assistance.”

The U.S. government’s efforts to organize an armed intervention into Haiti over the past year are symbiotic with the GFA. Under the GFA, the U.S. government can negotiate “planned security assistance” with Haiti as part of a 10-year plan, but to do so, Washington wants a nominally elected government.

Blinken explained in a recent official statement that the GFA “underpins” a new strategy and provides an “ambitious framework for engaging creatively” with the United-States’ “global partners.” This new strategy is explained in a 2020 document titled “United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability” (SPCPS), published by the State Department, Defense Department, USAID, and Treasury Department.

The SPCPS meets the GFA’s requirement for Washington’s “Global Fragility Strategy” and also outlines the its initial plan for providing 10-year “security-assistance” programs to its “partners.”

Washington wants to improve Haiti’s “governance of the security sector,” in addition to “professionaliz[ing] partner nation security forces, and build long-term relationships with key host nation security officials consistent with U.S. national security and economic interests.” (emphasis added).

In a follow-up document titled the “10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti,” the U.S. outlined its intent to “integrate U.S. diplomacy, development, and security-sector engagement in Haiti.” In other words, the State Department, USAID, and the Pentagon – soft power and hard – will work together to implement the Global Fragility Strategy in Haiti.

Kenya is providing personnel for Phase one of Washington’s “10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti” under the guise of providing support to the PNH. It’s the spearhead of the GFA “partnership” between Haiti and the U.S..

In a prepared statement to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Jim Saenz, Deputy Assistant Secretary Defense for Counternarcotics and Stabilization Policy, explained that the “DoD’s role in GFA implementation is to support the efforts of the Department of State as the lead, and the USAID as the lead implementer ” to “ensure that the 10-year plans …align the relevant goals, objectives, plans, and benchmarks with DoD policy.”

A key feature of Washington’s strategy is to intervene in Haiti’s affairs by directing USAID funds to Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) who are open to the U.S. government’s “market-based approaches” to “promoting stability” under a “partnership” imposed by a multinational armed force officially requested by Haiti’s current dictator, Dr. Ariel Henry.

The State Department Implements its 10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti

The 10-year Strategic Plan for Haiti outlines the first two phases for the implementation of the Global Fragility Act in Haiti.

During Phase one, the U.S. government outlines a plan to “engage and leverage partners among Haitian civil society and the Haitian National Police (PNH) to inform and implement programming to strengthen citizen security and the rule of law.”

“Initial efforts will focus on key high-crime and high-violence neighborhoods and key transportation and economic hubs” the plan explains.

The UN Security Council’s (UNSC) approval of the one-year MSS non-UN mission to Haiti means Phase one is moving ahead.

This UNSC vote comes almost one year after Henry’s initial Oct. 6, 2022 request for “the immediate deployment of a specialized armed force, in sufficient quantity, to stop throughout the territory the humanitarian crisis caused by, among other things, the insecurity resulting from the criminal actions of armed gangs and their sponsors.”

Kenya is slated to lead the MSS, despite widespread popular and political resistance both in Kenya and Haiti, as well as internationally. Henry’s political rivals – the signatories to the Kingston Joint Declaration and the “January 30th Agreement” –  are opposed to the MSS with Henry in power and insist that a transitional government must be put in place before the MSS enters Haiti.

A Kenyan press report explains that Kenya has said it will focus on guarding key infrastructure – ports, airports, and main roads. Le Nouvelliste, on the other hand, reported that Kenya will deploy a task force to combat armed gangs in Port-au-Prince.

Ecuador and several CARICOM countries have also pledged support and personnel for the Kenyan-led MSS, including Jamaica, the Bahamas, Barbados, and Antigua and Barbuda. The Miami Herald reported that Italy, Spain, Mongolia, Senegal, Belize, Suriname, Guatemala, and Peru have also offered support, although it is unclear what form this will take.

Speaking on Fri., Sep. 22 at the start of a UN meeting in New York, Antony Blinken said the United States would supply “robust financial and logistical assistance” to the MSS, promising US$200 million.

The MSS is an invasion of Haiti that could lead to a brutal 10 year occupation

In essence, Kenya is offering to provide personnel for Phase one of Washington’s 10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti under the guise of providing security and support to the PNH. It is the spearhead of the GFA “partnership” between Haiti and the U.S..

“This proposed invasion is different from those of 1994 and 2004,” Kim Ives explained, “which involved bonafide UN blue-helmeted ‘peacekeepers’ under the control and oversight of the Security Council itself. The MSS’s unprecedented formula would be nominally overseen by Kenya, but actually by the U.S..”

Kenya provides the “Blackwashing” necessary for the U.S.-led invasion. This approach helps the UN avoid accountability as well. As Ben Norton explained, “It is a U.S. military intervention, using the UN and Kenya as cover.”

While the MSS’s purported purpose is to combat gangs, the primary goal is to facilitate a controlled changeover from Henry’s embattled regime to another transitional government also beholden to Washington.

Henry has been accused of playing a role in President Jovenel Moïse’s Jul. 7, 2021 assassination as well as backing some of Haiti’s most notorious criminal gangs. Henry was installed as PM by the U.S. government and its allied embassies, known as the “CORE Group,” via a short statement and tweet days after Moise’s assassination.

Since his selection, Henry has ruled without popular support or a single elected official in his government. He dutifully imposed U.S. policy in Haiti, allowing Haiti’s state institutions to crumble.

The UNSC only approved a one-year mandate for the MSS with renewal reviews after nine months. It is not surprising, however, that Kenyan Foreign Minister Alfred Mutua told the New York Times that their recent assessment “estimated that the project would take three years and require from 10,000 to 20,000 personnel.” He sanguinely explained that he “envisions some 50 more countries each pledging from 500 to 1,000 officers, so they can achieve the 20,000 or more needed.”

Jake Johnston commented on X (formerly Twitter), writing “MINUSTAH 2.0, the non-UN sequel?” The comparison is as obvious as it is ominous.

MINUSTAH is how the U.S. “outsourced its control of Haiti,” author and activist Bill Quigley explained. The UN force helped consolidate Washington’s post-2004-coup puppet prime minister Gérard Latortue and committed multiple crimes and massacres against the Haitian people. The force varied in size over the 13 years it was deployed in Haiti, averaging about 9,000 military troops and 4,000 police officers from 56 mostly poor countries.

MINUSTAHs initial mandate was also for only six months, starting in 2004 following the coup against democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The mandate was extended several times. MINUSTAH occupied Haiti for 13 years – until 2017, where it was replaced by another Chapter VII armed force, MINUJUSTH.

Comprised at its peak of about 1,300 police officers, MINUJUSTH remained in Haiti for another two years, until 2019.

Mutua’s timeline of three years – triple the proposed one year MSS mission timeline – is surely an underestimate. Indeed, in a March 2023 interview, the International Crisis Group’s Renata Segura was pushed to explain how long the mission would take. She responded “probably years.”

Kim Ives’ Oct. 5 tweet about opposition leader Babu Owino saying that the Kenyan parliament and street demonstrations could block Ruto’s plan to lead the MSS.

Five months ago, while discussing a timeline for a multinational intervention force in Haiti, retired Canadian General Tom Lawson told CBC Radio that “we’re not talking a couple of years. We’re likely talking five to 10, 15 years, because we’re talking about nation-building. We’re not talking about establishing a safe and secure area for the government now to get to its tasks. We’re talking about a non-functioning government…And that’s in terms of – like we’ve seen in Afghanistan and Iraq – decades.”

Lawson’s comments underline that the MSS is an occupation force aiming to set the stage for the GFA’s “10 year security assistance” package.

Opposition emerges in Kenya itself

But the MSS is far from a done deal, despite the UNSC’s benediction. It hinges on Kenya’s leadership, and the Kenyan people may not put up with it.

On Oct. 5, Kim Ives tweeted that Kenyan parliamentarian Babu Owino believes there is a “102 percent” chance that Kenyan lawmakers will be able to prevent a deployment of 1,000 Kenyan police officers to Haiti, offering a ray of hope for Haiti. Owino shared his views during a Zoom conference with journalists and activists.

But Kenyan President William Ruto’s government can be expected to strike back. In July, Owino was arrested by Kenyan police and detained for three days for speaking out against police brutality.

This is a foreshadowing of the kind of violent oppression of dissent that will result from Kenyan forces occupying Port-au-Prince. Kenyan police have a “culture of internal impunity and criminality, and inadequate internal and external accountability,” explained Peter Kiama, the executive director of Kenya’s watchdog Independent Medico-Legal Unit. Kenyan police have also been accused of torture and shooting civilians.

As Owino predicted, the invasion plan has encountered pushback. On Oct. 9, the Kenyan High Court blocked Kenya’s deployment as part of the MSS in Haiti until Oct. 24, 2023, following a petition submitted by the Third Way Alliance political party.

(To be continued)


Travis Ross is a teacher based in Montreal, Québec. He is also the co-editor of the Canada-Haiti Information Project at canada-haiti.ca . Travis has written for Haiti Liberté, Black Agenda Report, The Canada Files, TruthOut, and rabble.ca. He can be reached on Twitter

La Fondation Open Eyes (FJKL) n’est pas un groupe de défense des droits humains crédible

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Jimmy « Barbecue » Cherizier au bas de Delmas en novembre 2022. Photo: Kim Ives/Haïti Liberté

Reportage FJKL sur La Saline

En novembre 2018, la FJKL opérait depuis cinq mois en tant qu’organisation de défense des droits humains. Leur rapport, intitulé « Situation de Terreur à La Saline », est leur première enquête sur les droits humains.

D’après ce qui est disponible en ligne, il s’agit de la troisième publication de la FJKL. Il faisait suite à un commentaire et à une lettre ouverte adressée au Premier ministre de l’époque, Jean-Henry Céant.

Le commentaire, publié en septembre 2018, portait sur une ordonnance du 6 avril 2018 du juge Jean Wilner Morin de poursuivre une enquête sur un éventuel blanchiment d’argent par la Fondation Aristide pour la démocratie (AFD).

Considérant le rôle présumé de Gilles dans la tentative de piéger Yvon Neptune, et le rôle de Madistin en tant qu’avocat engagé par Pierre Espérance et le NCHR-Haïti (RNDDH) pour représenter les « victimes » du massacre fabriqué de la Scierie pour piéger les dirigeants de Fanmi Lavalas, ce choix de L’accent mis sur l’AFD est évidemment politique.

Au moment de la rédaction du reportage, le mouvement Petrocaribe avait commencé, avec Gilbert Mirambeau postant son désormais célèbre tweet demandant au gouvernement haïtien « Kòt Kòb Petwo Karibe a??? » (« Où est l’argent PetroCaribe ? ») en août 2018. Cela faisait suite à un rapport du Sénat haïtien de fin 2017 accusant les politiciens d’avoir détourné 1,7 milliard de dollars via des contrats sans appel d’offres accordés par le gouvernement haïtien entre 2008 et 2016.

D’une manière ou d’une autre, dans ce contexte, Gilles et Madistin ont décidé que la première affaire de leurs nouvelles organisations de défense des droits humains devrait être un commentaire sur une ordonnance rendue par un juge en avril concernant des allégations de blanchiment d’argent au sein de l’AFD. Le commentaire de la FJKL affirme que l’ordonnance du juge contre l’AFD « constitue une étape importante dans la lutte contre le blanchiment d’argent, la corruption et l’impunité des fonctionnaires ». Il faudrait encore deux mois à la FJKL pour produire un rapport sur le scandale Petrocaribe.

Le temps nécessaire à FJKL pour produire ces publications est également un facteur important. Dans le cas du commentaire de l’ordonnance du juge Morin contre l’AFD, plusieurs mois se sont écoulés entre la création de la FJKL et la publication du commentaire. Il s’est également écoulé plusieurs mois entre le rapport du Sénat haïtien sur Petrocaribe et l’analyse publiée par la FJKL.

Le rapport préliminaire du 16 novembre sur La Saline a été publié dans les trois jours suivant les violences à La Saline. Le rapport de la FJKL sur La Saline est vague quant aux sources des allégations. Il fournit cependant un récit qui conclut que : a) les violences de La Saline résultent d’une attaque d’un gang contre un autre et b) Jimmy Cherizier a « renforcé » l’attaque.

Il est significatif que les trois cibles des deux premières publications de la FJKL soient Aristide, Jovenel Moïse et Jimmy Cherizier – qui furent tous, à un moment ou à un autre, des opposants à Réginald Boulos.

 

Le témoignage délibérément omis de la FJKL qui contredit les allégations de son rapport

Mario Brunache, vétéran de la guerre du Vietnam haïtiano-américain et facteur à la retraite, vit au bas de Delmas. Il a contribué à fonder l’organisme communautaire Another Vision avec Jimmy Cherizier au printemps 2018. Brunache a été interviewé par FJKL pour leur reportage sur La Saline, mais son témoignage a été omis du reportage. Brunache est l’un des nombreux témoins qui affirment que Cherizier dormait chez lui lorsque les attentats ont eu lieu à La Saline le 13 novembre 2018.

FJKL n’a pas seulement omis le témoignage de Brunache. Il n’a pas pris la peine de se rendre dans la zone de bas Delmas pour interroger Chérizier ou les autres témoins qui pourraient témoigner que Chérizier dormait sur un matelas à même le sol d’un appartement lorsque des reportages radio ont affirmé qu’il faisait partie d’une attaque en cours à La Saline.

Madistin a été interpellé par le journaliste Kim Ives, co-réalisateur du documentaire « Another Vision ». Madistin a affirmé qu’il n’avait pas l’adresse de Cherizier et que le quartier était de toute façon trop dangereux pour être visité.

L’affirmation de Madistin est manifestement fausse. Des dizaines de journalistes des grands médias occidentaux ont interviewé Chérizier dans le bas Delmas, indemnes. En fait, de nombreux journalistes ayant visité le territoire de la FRG9 ont remarqué à quel point le bas Delmas est sûr et propre, contrastant fortement avec les autres quartiers dirigés par les gangs fédérés du G-Pep. Cherizier remercie les dons de la diaspora haïtienne d’avoir facilité son quartier bien rangé.

Cherizier a accusé la FJKL (et le RNDDH) de partialité et d’allégations fabriquées de toutes pièces contre lui. Il a déclaré aux journalistes que le RNDDH et la FJKL « sont tous deux des partis politiques et non des organisations de défense des droits de l’homme ».

L’écrivain et militant de longue date André Charlier partage ce constat, qualifiant le RNDDH de « parti politique ayant la façade d’une organisation de défense des droits de l’homme ». Charlier estime que Cherizier est une « menace pour la petite-bourgeoisie » en Haïti, à l’instar de Pierre Espérance qu’il qualifie d’« anti-haïtien ».

Le rapport du FJKL La Saline affirme que Chérizier était impliqué sans aucune motivation politique. Il présente simplement Cherizier comme fournissant un « renfort » à Nèg Chabon, le gang prétendument lié au PHTK qui a attaqué un gang rival de La Saline le 13 novembre 2018. Ce rival était le gang Projet La Saline, alors dirigé par Hervé Bonnet Barthélemy, alias « Bout Jean Jean », proche du député Lavalas Roger Millien.

Le rapport du RNDDH La Saline a été le premier à publier des allégations concoctées par Millien selon lesquelles Cherizier aurait participé à une réunion de planification avec des responsables du PHTK quelques jours avant les violences de La Saline. Millien a reconnu connaître le chef du gang Projet La Saline, désigné dans le rapport de la FJKL sous le nom de Nèg anndan yo, situé dans le quartier Kafou Labatwa/Fòtouron de La Saline. En effet, Millien a conduit Bout Jean Jean et d’autres membres du gang à l’hôpital Bernard Mevs après avoir été blessés début novembre, comme le rapporte Le Nouvelliste et confirmé par Millien lui-même.

On comprend de plus en plus que Cherizier est la cible d’une campagne de désinformation menée en grande partie par des soi-disant organisations de défense des droits de l’homme. Dans une interview avec Jon Lee Anderson du New Yorker, le leader du Syndicat de la police haïtienne, Lionel Lazarre, « a refusé de désavouer Barbecue ». Lazarre a déclaré que Cherizier « a été poussé vers ce qu’il est aujourd’hui par des organisations de défense des droits de l’homme ».

La FJKL a également ciblé un autre leader qui bénéficie d’un soutien enthousiaste et généralisé de la population locale : Jean Ernst Muscadin.

Commissaire de Miragoâne, Jean Ernest Muscadin, aux Cayes, le 29 août 2023.
Photo: Dan Cohen/ Uncaptured Media

La FJKL cible Jean Ernst Muscadin

Dans une lettre ouverte du 2 juin 2022 au ministre de la Justice Berto Dorcé, la FJKL accuse le commissaire Jean-Ernst Muscadin d’avoir exécuté un accusé, Elvain Saint-Jacques, à Miragoâne. L’allégation était basée sur une vidéo qui a commencé à circuler le 30 mai. La FJKL a exigé la démission et la poursuite de Muscadin. Saint Jacques est mieux connu sous son pseudo de gang, « Zo pwason ». Il était membre du gang Five Seconds d’Izo, l’un des gangs de kidnapping les plus notoires et les plus brutaux de Port-au-Prince.

Dans une interview avec Addicted Press, Muscadin a déclaré que « ce qui s’est passé n’est pas une erreur. Je l’ai fait. Ils m’ont envoyé un signal, je leur ai répondu. Les bandits doivent savoir qu’ils ne sont pas les seuls détenteurs des clés de la mort. Ils doivent savoir qu’il existe encore des gens capables de leur tenir tête.»

Dorcé a convoqué Muscadin suite aux accusations. Muscadin a alors menacé d’arrêter Gilles si elle entrait dans Miragoane. Il a également laissé entendre qu’elle se rangeait en fait du côté des gangs criminels.

Apparemment intrépide face aux menaces du gouvernement de facto d’Henry, Muscadin a déclaré que « tant que je serai commissaire de Miragoâne, ma juridiction sera un cimetière à ciel ouvert pour les bandits de Martissant et de Grand Ravine en quête de refuge ».

Muscadin a des raisons pour son attitude inébranlable. Selon tous les témoignages, il bénéficie d’un large soutien enthousiaste de la part de la population de Miragoâne. Suite aux menaces de Dorcé et de Gilles, des milliers de partisans ont envahi les rues pour soutenir Muscadin. Une semaine plus tôt, une autre grande manifestation avait éclaté après des rumeurs selon lesquelles Muscadin serait transféré hors de Miragoâne.

La popularité du Muscadin ne se limite pas à Miragoâne. Fin juin 2023, il a reçu un SUV blindé, payé par des membres anonymes de la diaspora haïtienne. L’achat a été organisé par la journaliste Theriel Thelus. Muscadin a exprimé sa gratitude à la diaspora pour son soutien et sa confiance.

Le soutien populaire à l’intérieur et à l’extérieur d’Haïti ne semble pas être un facteur pertinent dans l’analyse de Madistin. Dans une interview accordée à Magik 9, Madistin a déclaré que Muscadin n’était « pas la solution à l’insécurité croissante dans le pays ». Il a accusé Muscadin d’être un « bandit légal », dont les actions « peuvent être bien plus dangereuses que celles des bandits armés ».

Madistin a ensuite adopté une ligne d’attaque souvent utilisée contre Chérizier, déclarant : « Muscadin est accompagné d’un groupe de civils armés. Nous ne savons pas comment fonctionne ce groupe. D’où viennent les armes et munitions utilisées par Muscadin ? L’allégation selon laquelle Muscadin armerait une brigade de vigilance avec des armes confisquées à des gangs ou achetées aux États-Unis devrait-elle être retenue contre lui ?

Sans surprise, Pierre Espérance et le RNDDH ont également critiqué Muscadin, le jugeant « accompagné de civils lourdement armés » en « possession d’armes illégales ». Le RNDDH a dénoncé Muscadin parce qu’il « exécute des gens, qu’il présente comme des bandits, après les avoir soumis à des interrogatoires hâtifs ». Espérance a qualifié Muscadin de « délinquant, membre du G9, travaillant pour le PHTK ». (Muscadin a nié toutes les accusations dans une interview qui sera bientôt publiée le 30 août par Haïti Liberté et Redacted.)

Espérance ne se soucie pas de comprendre les raisons sous-jacentes du large soutien populaire dont bénéficie Muscadin. Les rédacteurs de Press Lakay semblent cependant avoir cette compréhension, déclarant dans un éditorial que Muscadin est « largement considéré comme l’un des commissaires gouvernementaux les plus efficaces de la République ». Ils ont fait valoir que « toute tentative de le démettre de ses fonctions serait risquée », soulignant qu’aucune mesure n’a été prise par Dorcé avant qu’il ne soit démis de ses fonctions.

La FJKL est une organisation politique ayant la façade d’un groupe de défense des droits de l’homme

La violence perpétrée par des gangs armés soutenus par des oligarques, qui fonctionnent comme des groupes paramilitaires, a fracturé la capitale haïtienne. La statistique souvent citée selon laquelle 80 % de Port-au-Prince est contrôlée par des gangs est trompeuse. La majorité de Port-au-Prince est contrôlée par des gangs soutenus par des oligarques qui fonctionnent souvent comme des groupes paramilitaires. Ils s’opposent aux brigades de vigilance et aux groupes anticriminalité comme le FRG9, Bwa Kale et aux dirigeants locaux comme Muscadin.

Malgré les combats qui ont fait rage entre les gangs FRG9 et G-Pèp au cours de la majeure partie des deux dernières années, trois trêves majeures ont été négociées ces deux derniers mois : 1) entre Ti Bwa (Krisla) et Grand Ravine (Ti Lapli) avec Village de Dieu (Izo) ; 2) entre Brooklyn (Gabriel) à Cité Soleil et Iscard (Belekou) avec Mathias (Boston) ; et 3) entre Belair (Toto Alexandre et Kempes Sanon) et le bas Delmas (Chérizier).

Cherizier a déclaré à Haïti Liberté que « ce ne sont pas des alliances, mais des accords de paix ». Néanmoins, de nombreux experts médiatiques présentent les accords de paix comme une alliance de facto entre le FRG9 anti-criminalité et la fédération des gangs criminels G-Pèp.

Les bandes criminelles s’étendent désormais bien au-delà de Port-au-Prince, dans les zones rurales, menaçant l’agriculture et les approvisionnements alimentaires locaux. De plus, l’insécurité et la menace de violence empêchent le transport des produits cultivés. Alors que plus d’un tiers de la population est confronté à une faim aiguë, l’accès à la nourriture est vital.

Ces bandes armées ont déstabilisé Haïti, justifiant une intervention étrangère demandée par Henry pour consolider son pouvoir. Cela souligne le soutien de Boulos aux gangs associés au G-Pep et son soutien à Ariel Henry. Boulos, comme de nombreux oligarques haïtiens, souhaite qu’une force militaire étrangère envahisse et occupe Haïti et protège ses entreprises.

Bwa Kale et la RFA9 sont le résultat, en partie, de l’incapacité de la classe politique à organiser un gouvernement de transition crédible et à forcer Henry à quitter ses fonctions. Ce sont, comme l’explique le directeur d’Haïti Liberté, Berthony Dupont, « des mouvements organiques, autonomes, pratiquement spontanés ». Ils sont une réponse non seulement aux actes quotidiens de violence dépravée commis par des gangs armés soutenus par des oligarques, mais aussi au vide politique qui a conduit au règne ininterrompu d’Henry en tant que dictateur soutenu par les États-Unis.

Ce vide de leadership politique a conduit à la montée en puissance de dirigeants locaux qui défendent leurs communautés. Bwa Kale est peut-être sans chef. Il existe cependant plusieurs dirigeants locaux qui ont contribué à organiser des brigades de vigilance dans leurs communautés dans le cadre du mouvement Bwa Kale.

Tous sont parvenus à la même conclusion : la résistance armée aux bandes criminelles est nécessaire. L’État a depuis longtemps abandonné sa responsabilité d’éradiquer la violence des gangs et de protéger les citoyens contre la violence.

La PNH ne veut pas ou est incapable de lutter contre les bandes criminelles. Par conséquent, des dizaines – peut-être davantage – d’agents de la PNH ont choisi de rejoindre ou de collaborer avec FRG9 ou leur brigade de vigilance locale, reconnaissant l’impuissance des dirigeants de la PNH et la nécessité immédiate de débarrasser leurs quartiers des bandes criminelles.

En effet, le 24 juin 2023, l’Initiative Patriote Marien (IPAM) a publié un communiqué appelant à « l’organisation de brigades de vigilance sur l’ensemble du territoire pour protéger la population et lutter contre les gangs, les assassins, les ravisseurs et les éléments corrompus du régime d’Ariel Henry. L’IPAM est un collectif de représentants de 33 comités locaux des régions du Nord et du Nord-Est d’Haïti.

La FJKL est fondamentalement un groupe politique ayant la façade d’une organisation de défense des droits de l’homme. Que ce soit envers les oligarques haïtiens comme Réginald Boulos ou le gouvernement américain, la FJKL s’engage envers ses bienfaiteurs et les allégeances de classe de ses dirigeants.

La  FJKL, tout comme le RNDDH, n’est pas une organisation crédible de défense des droits humains.

 

*Travis Ross est un enseignant basé à Montréal, Québec. Il est également co-éditeur du Projet d’information Canada-Haïti sur canada-haiti.ca. Travis a écrit pour Haïti Liberté, Black Agenda Report, The CanadaFiles, TruthOut et rabble.ca. Il peut être contacté sur Twitter.

 

 

La Fondation Je Klere (FJKL) n’est pas un groupe de défense des droits humains crédible

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Samuel Madistin, président du FJKL

Samuel Madistin, président du FJKL

Gilles dirige le FJKL avec son président, Samuel Madistin, avocat en exercice.

Après avoir représenté le département de l’Artibonite en tant que sénateur dans les années 1990, Madistin est revenu à la politique en 2015 lorsqu’il a cherché à être le candidat présidentiel du Mouvement patriotique populaire dessalinien (MOPOD), une coalition politique devenue parti.

La rivale de Madistin pour la nomination du MOPOD était l’ancienne Première dame Mirlande Manigat, actuellement présidente du Haut Conseil de transition (HCT) d’Ariel Henry.

L’ancien sénateur Turneb Delpé, membre du MOPOD, a décrit le parti comme un mélange de « démocrates-chrétiens », de socialistes, de « libéraux » et de nationalistes auto-identifiés.

Madistin a perdu contre Manigat. Les membres du parti avaient des raisons de croire que Manigat était un candidat fort. Elle a remporté le premier tour des élections de 2010, mais le département d’État américain est intervenu dans l’élection et le candidat qu’il a choisi, Michel Martelly, a remporté le deuxième tour dans ce qui est largement considéré comme une élection truquée.

Un mois plus tard, Manigat retire sa candidature. Dans une lettre aux membres du parti, elle a déclaré que « les élections telles qu’elles sont programmées, annoncées et fixées selon un calendrier impossible, laissent présager un faux vote qui ne respecte pas les principes démocratiques ».

L’investiture a ensuite été rendue à Madistin, qui a assumé ce rôle avec enthousiasme et a officiellement lancé sa campagne quelques mois plus tard. Le programme de Madistin comprenait de nombreuses promesses d’investissement dans les infrastructures, l’agriculture, la santé publique, l’énergie, le reboisement, l’éducation et la gouvernance. Aucun détail n’a été fourni sur la manière dont tous ces projets seraient financés. Dans son discours de remerciement, Madistin a présenté ses idéaux comme ceux d’un social-démocrate. Il a déclaré aux membres du parti qu’Haïti avait besoin d’un « État uni, souverain, démocratique et populaire… qui se donne les moyens de lutter efficacement contre la corruption et les inégalités sociales ». Un plan généreux sans détails sur la manière dont il pourrait être mis en œuvre.

Ignorant l’évaluation de Manigat quant à la probabilité d’une ingérence étrangère dans les élections de 2015-2016, Madistin s’est présenté à la présidence, en compétition avec 54 autres candidats. Il a perdu. Seulement 18 % des électeurs ont voté lors de l’élection, soit environ 1,5 million d’Haïtiens. Madistin a obtenu environ 13 000 voix, soit moins de 1 % du total.

Le scrutin de 2015-2016 a porté au pouvoir Jovenel Moïse et a été largement considéré comme une élection simulée. Comme tant d’autres politiciens et partis politiques, Madistin a tacitement approuvé l’élection en choisissant de se présenter, renforçant ainsi le pouvoir du PHTK sur Haïti.

L’année après l’investiture de Moïse à la présidence d’Haïti, Madistin et Gilles ont fondé le FJKL en mai 2018 (environ un an après que Gilles a quitté le RNDDH).

On ne sait pas exactement d’où vient le financement du FJKL. Depuis ses années au RNDDH, Gilles a montré une claire volonté de recevoir des financements des agences impérialistes, notamment la NED, l’USAID, le gouvernement canadien et le gouvernement français.

Pendant ce temps, Madistin est l’avocat de Reginald Boulos, l’un des oligarques bourgeois les plus riches d’Haïti. Cela suggère une autre source probable de financement pour le FJKL.

Reginald Boulos, un éminent fondateur et membre du Groupe des 184 organisé par la NED lors du coup d’État de 2004, est accusé d’avoir soutenu financièrement les paramilitaires pour forcer Aristide à quitter le pouvoir lors du coup d’État de 2004 soutenu par les États-Unis. Dans une interview avec Peter Hallward, on a demandé au chef paramilitaire Guy Philip si Boulos et d’autres oligarques avaient subventionné son mouvement. En réponse, Philippe a répondu : « Oui, nous avons eu des réunions avec divers hommes d’affaires et ils nous ont aidés… ils ont contribué environ 200 000 $ (US) pour acheter des armes et des munitions. »

Selon sa page Linkedin, « Boulos est l’ancien et actuel président de la Chambre haïtienne de commerce et d’industrie, et membre de la Chambre de commerce haïtiano-américaine, de l’Association médicale haïtienne et de l’Association haïtienne de santé publique ».

Multimillionnaire, Boulos est également « PDG de Boulos Investment Group, qui comprend Autoplaza S.A., le deuxième plus grand concessionnaire automobile ; Delimart S.A, la plus grande chaîne de supermarchés d’Haïti ; Pehacheve, une société leader dans la distribution pharmaceutique ; La radio Multipresse S.A. qu’il a cofondée, et Le Nouveau Matin, l’un des deux quotidiens d’Haïti.

​ Médecin de formation, Boulos est impliqué dans la mort de 87 enfants haïtiens après que sa société, Pharval Pharmaceuticals, ait produit un sirop contre la toux empoisonné qui a été distribué dans les quartiers pauvres de Port-au-Prince. Un rapport d’Ayibopost de 2018 affirme qu’« au moins 77 enfants âgés de un à 13 mois ont péri dans cette tragédie », tandis que 10 autres survivants souffrent d’un handicap permanent.

Boulos est également lié à un autre épisode de faute professionnelle médicale contre des enfants haïtiens. En 1996, The Haïti Information Project a signalé le cas de plus de 2 000 bébés à Cité Soleil qui avaient reçu une dose irrégulièrement élevée d’un vaccin expérimental contre la rougeole. Ce « test gouvernemental » a été mené par les Centres pour le Développement et la Santé (CDS), financés par les États-Unis, que Boulos dirigeait alors.

Richard Sanders décrit le Groupe des 184 comme « la coalition la plus puissante d’organisations de la « société civile » en Haïti pendant la période précédant le coup d’État de 2004. » Il était dominé par l’élite des affaires d’Haïti qui était financée par les agences d’« aide » et de « promotion de la démocratie » des gouvernements américain, canadien et européen. Sanders a expliqué que « le G184 a coordonné et mené avec succès la campagne visant à déstabiliser le gouvernement élu d’Haïti et à destituer le président Aristide ».

Tom Reeves a critiqué le Groupe des 184, le qualifiant de « guère plus qu’une liste d’apologistes pro-élites et pro-entreprises bien connus en Haïti, dont la plupart n’ont pratiquement aucun public public ».

Comme le rapporte Haïti Liberté, Boulos a également pris sur lui d’armer les forces de police du régime de facto, qui ont violemment réprimé les manifestations exigeant le retour du président en exil Aristide, tuant de nombreux manifestants et passants.

L’éminent homme d’affaires haïtien Reginald Boulos est accusé d’avoir soutenu financièrement les paramilitaires pour forcer Aristide à quitter le pouvoir lors du coup d’État de 2004 soutenu par les États-Unis.

Madistin est le représentant légal de Réginald et Rudolphe Boulos

Madistin a travaillé à plusieurs reprises comme avocat de Boulos. Il représente les membres de la famille Boulos depuis plus d’une décennie et le frère de Réginald Boulos, Rudolphe Boulos, dès 2008.

Rudolphe Boulos a été jugé pénalement responsable du cas précité d’empoisonnement de 87 enfants haïtiens alors qu’il était président de Pharval Pharmaceuticals. Le juge Jean Wilner Morin a condamné Boulos à six mois de prison et l’a condamné à payer trois millions de gourdes de dommages et intérêts à chacune des victimes. Ce jugement fait suite à une enquête exhaustive publiée dans le Journal Public Health Report qui a montré que Pharval n’avait pas suivi la procédure standard ni vérifié que les ingrédients étaient certifiés.

Rudolphe Boulos n’a jamais purgé un seul jour de prison. On ne sait pas non plus s’il a payé aux victimes et à leurs familles les sommes dues. Rudolphe Boulos a quitté Haïti pour échapper à une condamnation suite au jugement.

Madistin a déposé un recours au nom de Boulos et a refusé de commenter les médias.

Madistin a plus récemment représenté Reginald Boulos lorsque l’oligarque devait être entendu par une commission d’enquête de la Direction générale de l’Unité de lutte contre la corruption (ULCC) du gouvernement haïtien, le 2 juillet 2021. Selon un rapport d’Haïti Liberté, Isabelle Papillon, l’ULCC enquêtait sur deux prêts importants reçus par Boulos pour un projet de construction d’appartements (RBI), et sa chaîne de supermarchés Delimart.

Papillon a expliqué en outre que « Jenley Marc Jean-Baptiste, directeur général de l’ONA, a soutenu l’initiative de la CHLC d’enquêter sur le différend entre l’ONA et RBI. Dans une note du 2 juillet, Jean-Baptiste écrit que l’ONA « condamne avec véhémence le détournement de ses fonds d’un montant d’un million de dollars américains par la société Real Business Investment SA, société appartenant à M. Pierre Réginald Boulos, dans le cadre du un projet fictif de construction de logements sociaux à Fermathe, mis en place en 2018. »

Boulos a refusé de se présenter à l’audience et un mandat d’arrêt a été émis contre lui. Ses comptes bancaires en Haïti ont été gelés.

Deux jours plus tard, le 7 juillet 2021, le président Moïse était assassiné. Les charges retenues contre Boulos ont été rapidement abandonnées par le juge Bernard Sainvil en l’absence des avocats de l’ONA, stoppant ainsi dans son élan l’enquête sur le projet de logement social « fictif » de Boulos.

À l’époque, Boulos était président du « Mouvement de la Troisième Voie pour Haïti » (MTVAyiti), un parti politique fondé en décembre 2019. Boulos a fondé MTVAyiti pour défier le président Jovenel Moise après leur dispute à l’été 2018.

En réponse à l’ULCC et à l’ONA, Boulos a publié la déclaration suivante le 3 juillet 2021 : « Ce n’est pas la première fois qu’ils utilisent le mensonge et la manipulation pour armer le système judiciaire contre un opposant politique », a-t-il écrit en kreyòl. « Ce n’est pas la première fois qu’ils inventent de fausses affaires pour couvrir de vrais cas de criminalité et de corruption. Nos yeux sont ouverts ! Un jour sera le jour ! La lutte continue pour un autre Haïti !

Lorsque le prêt a été annoncé pour la première fois à l’été 2018, il a été rapidement critiqué. Le prêt a facilité l’achat par Boulos d’une concession Nissan à Port-au-Prince. Dans un article du Nouvelliste, l’analyste financier Guy Laudé estime que « les deux dirigeants de l’institution ont créé un produit sur mesure, sans aucune référence juridique » et probablement développé pour pallier « le manque de capital de l’entreprise ».

Ainsi, tout en agissant en tant que président du groupe dit des « droits de l’homme », FJKL, Madistin représentait également un oligarque, accusé de manière crédible de corruption.

 

(À suivre)

 

Travis Ross est un enseignant basé à Montréal, Québec. Il est également co-éditeur du Projet d’information Canada-Haïti sur canada-haiti.ca. Travis a écrit pour Haïti Liberté, Black Agenda Report, The Canada Files, TruthOut et rabble.ca. Il peut être contacté sur Twitter.

 

The Open Eyes Foundation (FJKL) Is Not a Credible Human Rights Group (2)

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Marie Yolène Gilles and Samuel Madistin, the two heads of FJKL

(Part 1)

Haitian oligarch Réginald Boulos, once an enthusiastic supporter of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse, had a falling out with him in the summer of 2018.

Early in his mandate, Moïse prioritized Boulos’ companies for investment using state funds. Ayibopost notes that Boulos’ “Auto Plaza was among the three companies benefitting from the first big contract signed during the Jovenel Moïse era. The company then received more than $53 million for the purchase of heavy equipment in 2017.”

Boulos told the Haitian Times that he broke off his relationship with Moïse in 2019. While he did write a letter published in Le Nouvelliste in June 2019 demanding Moïse resign, the timeline Boulos presents to The Haitian Times seems to contradict his past statements.

In July 2018, following Moïse’s hiking of fuel prices due to an IMF pressure, massive protests rocked Port-au-Prince. Protestors vandalized and set fire to many businesses, including some owned by Boulos.

Protestors attacked his Nissan dealership and Delimart grocery store. In a public Jul. 19, 2018 letter, Boulos made it clear he did not think these attacks were random. He wrote that the attacks on his businesses were “coldly concocted and carried out under cover of the actions of disgruntled crowds.”

Réginald Boulos, one of Haiti’s foremost bourgeois oligarchs and coup-backers.

According to Boulos, these attacks “constitute the worst injustice done to a man who has spent his life creating jobs and today employs more than 2,000 of his brothers and sisters.” Boulos insisted that acts of arson targeting his businesses were the result of “the malicious action of criminals under contract.”

Appealing to his fellow Haitians, Boulos wrote in his statement that “things must change for the good in our country. We will have to take into account the legitimate demands for betterment emanating from the poor and marginalized categories of our people,” clearly alluding to efforts to oust Moïse from power.

Boulos’ interpretation of events, that his properties were deliberately attacked by “criminals under contract,” was not widely held.

On Jul. 3, 2021, Boulos had released a statement accusing Moïse of weaponizing the judicial system against him. Four days later, on Jul. 7, 2021, Jovenel Moïse was assassinated in his home.

Later that day, The Haitian Times posted an interview with Boulos where he denied speculation that he was involved in the assassination.

Moïse was assassinated by a squad of 28 foreign mercenaries, including two Haitian-Americans and 26 Colombians. One of the Haitian-Americans is James Solages, who worked as the chief of bodyguards for the Canadian Embassy in Haiti. The Haitian Times reported that, according to many social media posts, Solages also used to work as a security guard for Réginald Boulos.

In an interview with Jacobin, journalist Kim Ives noted that the assassination “may have required more money than one family could have provided,” pointing to the possible involvement of several oligarchs, including Boulos and Dimitri Vorbe. Ives argued that “the assassination is meant to get into power a president who will do the bidding of the bourgeoisie.”

Indeed, with Moïse out of the way, charges from the ULCC and ONA were dropped. Boulos had left Haiti a week earlier, on Jun. 25.

In the U.S., a day after Moïse’s assassination, Boulos began hiring public relations consultants. He re-hired Art Estopinan, former Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen’s (R-FL) chief of staff, to work for him as a lobbyist.

Jimmy “Barbecue” Cherizier in lower Delmas in November 2022. Photo: Kim Ives/Haïti Liberté

According to Politico, Estopinan planned to “lobby lawmakers, including members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the House Haiti Caucus, as well as the Biden administration.” Estopinan explained that Boulos wanted Estopinan to “help him in Washington to promote a vision of his political party.”

Boulos had other advisors working for him in the U.S. According to Politico, this team included Novitas Communications, which handles public relations for Boulos, and the consultant Joe Miklosi, who led fundraising efforts for Boulos in the U.S.. Boulos said he hired the team to lobby the Biden administration.

“I don’t feel the opposition today would have the capability to pull out such a well-organized mission,” Boulos told The Haitian Times.

Ariel Henry, the prime minister Moïse had nominated but not inaugurated two days before his murder, emerged from hiding a few days after the murder. He was selected to run Haiti by the U.S. and CORE Group of ambassadors via a tweet and accompanying statement by the United-Nations diplomatic mission in Haiti, BINUH. Henry was sworn in as the prime minister on Jul. 20, 2021, three days after this statement was released.

As the leader of MTVAyiti, Boulos then signed Ariel Henry’s “September 11 Accord.” Boulos had found a leader he could support. Boulos’ support for Henry’s Accord caused outrage among some in his new party. In a letter to his party dated Aug. 1, 2022, Boulos resigned as leader of MTVAyiti and left the party.

Boulos radicalizes Cherizier

In an interview featured in the documentary series “Another Vision”, Jimmy Cherizier claimed that Boulos had approached him to burn down the rival Toyota dealership across the road from his Delmas 6 neighborhood. Cherizier refused.

Cherizier had come to Boulos’ attention as a neighborhood defense group leader who had successfully forced out criminal gang members from lower Delmas with the help of other PNH officers. He had not yet organized or declared the FRG9 nor had he been cast as a “gang leader” by local human rights groups.

Cherizier and other residents of lower Delmas established a community organization named Another Vision (from which the documentary gets its title). The organization solicited donations, and Réginald Boulos made one.

Cherizier says he was unaware at the time of Boulos’ anti-democratic history of backing the 2004 coup and the human rights violations associated with the Group of 184.

Cherizier explains that Boulos’ request that he burn down the Toyota dealership was a radicalizing moment for him. A class consciousness began to emerge. In June 2020, he described Haiti’s “stinking, rotten, corrupt system” serving the bourgeoisie. In another interview a month later, Cherizier said “there is no bigger gang than that Syrian-Lebanese mafia bourgeoisie which has taken the nation hostage. And no-one has more guns than they have. They have all the money, and we have none.”

Nor was Cherizier aware at the time that Madistin was hired by NCHR-Haiti (RNDDH) in 2004 to represent the so-called victims of the manufactured La Scierie massacre, another telling fact revealed in the documentary “Another Vision.”

Some have interpreted this donation from Boulos to the Another Vision organization as evidence that Cherizier was a leader of a paramilitary group willing to work for Haitian oligarchs. That formulation omits crucial evidence to the contrary.

Once Boulos’ relationship with Cherizier ended in the summer of 2018, he formed new relationships with criminal gangs. In an October 2019 interview, Boulos admitted to supporting criminal gangs who are associated with the G-Pep criminal gang federation, responsible for virtually all of the kidnappings in Haiti, along with other violent crimes like murder, rape, and extortion.

On Nov. 16, 2018, FJKL published their preliminary report on the violence that occurred in La Saline on Nov. 13, 2018. FJKL presented the attack as a battle between two gangs, also alleging that Cherizier had “reinforced” (without more detail) the gang of the victorious Serge Alectis alias “Ti Junior.” Tacked on at the end, almost as an afterthought, is the sentence: “It is the massacre of La Saline,” without more explanation.

Exactly one year later, in November 2019, Boulos’ new political party, MTVAyiti, funded and organized a series of events on the anniversary of the La Saline massacre. This popularized the FJKL and RNDDH allegations that Cherizier was somehow linked to the deaths of 23 or more victims. The MTVAyiti “memorial day” for the La Saline victims was part of Boulos’ political campaign against Moïse.

Weeks before the memorial, in September 2019, Boulos referred to Moïse as an “imposter” and a “living restavek ” of former president Michel Martelly.

A month later, in October 2019, Moïse announced an increase on interest rates for loans from the ONA over 50 million gourdes to 20%. This would directly affect Boulos.

Réginald Boulos shows concern for victims of political violence?

Was Réginald Boulos motivated by compassion for poor Haitians victimized by violence to organize a day of commemoration of the so-called “La Saline Massacre”? The historical record suggests he was not.

Attacks on Lavalas supporters before and after the 2004 coup caused some to take up arms to defend their communities. These community defense groups were often portrayed by coup-supporters, the coup regime, and Western mainstream media as “criminal gangs.” One of these militant, pro-Lavalas community leaders was Emmanuel “Dread” Wilmer, based in Cité Soleil, one of the poorest parts of Port-au-Prince.

In an article for The Nation and Haïti Liberté, Dan Coughlin and Kim Ives noted that the residents of Cité Soleil saw Wilmer “as a hero defending them from pro-coup paramilitaries (who in 1994 burned many houses in the rebellious shantytown) and UN occupation troops.” He was a cherished leader who championed the community of Cité Soleil who, according to Haiti Action Committee’s Seth Donnelly, views itself as locked “in a long-term struggle for the restoration of President Aristide and for the removal of occupation forces from Haiti.”

Commissaire of Miragoâne, Jean Ernest Muscadin, in Aux Cayes, Aug. 29, 2023. Photo: Dan Cohen/Uncaptured Media

This put Wilmer and the residents of Cité Soleil at odds with oligarchs like Réginald Boulos and Andy Apaid, a prominent sweatshop owner and leader of the Group of 184, in which Boulos was also active. The Group of 184 was a so-called civil society ”coalition, created and supported by the NED that helped lead a destabilization campaign against Aristide until the latter’s ouster in the 2004 U.S.-backed coup.”

An analysis of Wikileaked-State Department cables by Haïti Liberté’s Ansel Herz revealed that “Apaid was financing an anti-Aristide gang in Cité Soleil led by Thomas Robenson, alias Labanyè, a gang leader.”

Aiming to create a justification for further PNH and MINUSTAH violence in Cité Soleil, Apaid paid Labanyè to terrorize Cité Soleil residents. The violence was then blamed on Lavalas militants like Wilmer.

After Labanyè was killed, these business elites had to find alternative means to eradicate Lavalas militancy from Cité Soleil. Another Wikileaked cable revealed that Haitian oligarch Fritz “Mevs told the [U.S.] Embassy that Réginald Boulos had “distributed arms to the police and had called on others to do so in order to provide cover to his own actions.”

Boulos was also eager to have MINUSTAH forces “cleanse” Cité Soleil of Lavalas militants. In an article for New Left Review, Justin Podur pointed out that “MINUSTAH’s civilian head of mission Juan Gabriel Valdés came under increasing pressure from Haitian business elites to resume the offensive.”

Boulos told Radio Métropole listeners on Jan. 5, 2006: “We are waiting for [Valdés] to give clear instructions to the troops under his command to cleanse Cité Soleil of the criminals, like they did in Bel Air. You cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs. We think that MINUSTAH’s generals need to make plans to limit collateral damage. But we in the private sector are ready to create a social assistance fund to help all those who would be innocent victims of a necessary and courageous action that should be carried out in Cité Soleil.”

Boulos was also eager to have MINUSTAH forces “cleanse” Cité Soleil of Lavalas militants.

On Jul. 6, 2005, MINUSTAH forces raided Cité Soleil. MINUSTAH’s intended target was Wilmer. What resulted was a massacre of at least 20 civilians, with another 26 wounded, including women and children. Other residents and a legal advocacy group say 60 or more Haitians were massacred that day.

In an article for Haïti Liberté, Ansel Hertz explained that the “battle for Cité Soleil continued over the next 18 months, with the toll of dozens of ‘unintentional civilian casualties’.”

So it seems unlikely that Boulos paid for the lavish 2019 rally out of concern for the residents of La Saline, long a Lavalas stronghold.

FJKL report on La Saline

In November 2018, FJKL had been operating for five months as a human rights organization. Their report, entitled “Situation de Térreur à La Saline” (Situation of Terror in La Saline) is their first human rights investigation.

Based on what is available online, this was FJKL’s third publication. It followed one commentary piece and an open letter to then Prime Minister Jean-Henry Céant.

The commentary piece, published in September 2018, focused on an Apr. 6, 2018 order from Judge Jean Wilner Morin to pursue an investigation into possible money laundering by the Aristide Foundation for Democracy (AFD).

Considering Gilles’ alleged role in an attempt to frame Yvon Neptune, and Madistin’s role as a lawyer hired by Éspérance and NCHR-Haiti (RNDDH) to represent the “victims” of the manufactured la Scierie massacre to frame Fanmi Lavalas leaders, this choice to focus on the AFD reads as evidently political.

At the time of the report, the Petrocaribe movement had begun, with Gilbert Mirambeau posting his now famous tweet asking the Haitian government “Kòt Kòb Petwo Karibe a???” (“Where is the PetroCaribe money ?”) in August 2018. This followed a Haitian Senate report from late 2017 that accused politicians of embezzling $1.7 billion via no-bid contracts given by the Haitian government between 2008 and 2016.

Somehow, in this context, Gilles and Madistin decided their new human rights organizations’ first case ought to be commentary on a judge’s order from April regarding alleged money laundering at the AFD. FJKL’s commentary claims the judge’s order against AFD “constitutes an important step in the fight against money laundering, corruption, and official impunity.” It would take FJKL another two months to produce a report on the Petrocaribe scandal.

The time FJKL required to produce these publications is an important factor as well. In the case of the commentary on the order by Judge Morin against AFD, several months passed between the FJKL’s founding and the commentary’s publication. There was also a period of several months between the Haitian Senate report on Petrocaribe and FJKL’s published analysis.

The Nov. 16 preliminary report on La Saline was released within 3 days of the violence in La Saline.

The FJKL report on La Saline is vague regarding sources of allegations. It does, however, provide a narrative that concludes that: a) the La Saline violence resulted from an attack by one gang against another and b) Jimmy Cherizier “reinforced” the attack.

It is significant that the three targets of FJKL’s first two publications were Aristide, Jovenel Moïse, and Jimmy Cherizier – all of whom were, at one time or another, opponents of Réginald Boulos.

FJKL’s deliberately omitted witness testimony that contradicts their report’s allegations

Mario Brunache, a Haitian-American Vietnam war vet and retired mail carrier lives in lower Delmas. He helped found the Another Vision community organization with Jimmy Cherizier in the spring of 2018. Brunache was interviewed by FJKL for their report on La Saline, but his testimony was omitted from the report. Brunache is one of several witnesses who say Cherizier was asleep at home when the attacks occurred in La Saline on Nov. 13, 2018.

FJKL not only omitted Brunache’s testimony. It didn’t bother to visit lower Delmas to interview Cherizier or the other witnesses who could testify that Cherizier was sleeping on a mattress on the floor of an apartment when radio reports claimed he was part of an ongoing attack in La Saline.

Madistin was challenged by journalist Kim Ives, co-director of the “Another Vision” documentary. Madistin claimed he didn’t have Cherizier’s address and that the neighborhood was too dangerous to visit anyway.

Madistin’s claim is patently untrue. Dozens of reporters from Western mainstream media have interviewed Cherizier in lower Delmas, unharmed. In fact, many journalists who visited FRG9 territory have remarked how secure and clean lower Delmas is, contrasting heavily with other neighborhoods ruled by G-Pep federated gangs. Cherizier credits donations from the Haitian diaspora for facilitating his tidy neighborhood.

Cherizier has accused FJKL (and the RNDDH) of bias and fabricating allegations against him. He told reporters that RNDDH and FJKL “are both political parties and not human rights organizations.”

Writer and long-time activist André Charlier agrees with this assessment, describing the RNDDH as a “political party with the facade of a human rights organization.” Charlier believes Cherizier is a “threat to petit-bourgeoisie” in Haiti like Pierre Espérance who he calls “anti-Haitian.”

The FJKL La Saline report alleges that Cherizier was involved put proffers no political motivation. It simply frames Cherizier as providing “reinforcement” for Nèg Chabon, the gang allegedly tied to the PHTK that attacked a rival La Saline gang on Nov. 13, 2018. That rival was the Projet La Saline gang, then led by Hervé Bonnet Barthélemy, alias “Bout Jean Jean,” who was close to Lavalas deputy Roger Millien.

The RNDDH La Saline report was the first to published allegations concocted by Millien that Cherizier had participated in a planning meeting with PHTK officials a few days before the La Saline violence. Millien admitted to knowing the leader of Projet La Saline gang, referred to in the FJKL report as Nèg anndan yo, located in the Kafou Labatwa/Fòtouron part of La Saline. In fact, Millien drove Bout Jean Jean and other gang members to Bernard Mevs hospital after they were wounded in early November, as reported by Le Nouvelliste and confirmed by Millien himself.

The understanding that Cherizier is the target of a disinformation campaign led largely by so-called human rights organizations is gaining momentum. In an interview with the New Yorker’s Jon Lee Anderson, Haitian Police Union leader Lionel Lazarre, “declined to disavow Barbecue.” Lazarre said Cherizier “was pushed into what he is now by human-rights organizations.”

FJKL has also targeted another leader who enjoys enthusiastic and widespread support from the local population: Jean Ernest Muscadin.

FJKL targets Jean Ernest Muscadin

In a Jun. 2, 2022 open letter to Justice Minister Berto Dorcé, FJKL accused commissaire (commissioner) Jean Ernest Muscadin of executing an accused gang member, Elvain Saint-Jacques, in Miragoâne. The allegation was based on a video that began circulating on May 30. FJKL demanded the resignation and the prosecution of Muscadin. Saint Jacques is better known by his gang handle, “Zo pwason.” He was a member of Izo’s Five Seconds gang, one of the most notorious and brutal kidnapping gangs in Port-au-Prince.

In an interview with Addicted Press, Muscadin said “what happened is not a mistake. I did it. They sent me a signal, I answered them. The bandits must know that they are not the only holders of the keys to death. They need to know that there are still people capable of standing up to them.”

Dorcé summoned Muscadin following the accusations. Muscadin then threatened to arrest Gilles if she stepped into Miragoane. He also implied that she was, in effect, siding with criminal gangs.

Seemingly undaunted by threats from Henry’s de facto government, Muscadin stated that “as long as I am commissaire of Miragoâne, my jurisdiction will be an open-air cemetery for the bandits of Martissant and Grand Ravine seeking refuge.”

Muscadin has reasons for his unflinching attitude. By all reports, he has a wide base of enthusiastic support from the population of Miragoâne. Following threats from Dorcé and Gilles, thousands of supporters flooded the streets in support of Muscadin. A week earlier, another large protest erupted after rumors that Muscadin would be transferred out of Miragoâne.

Muscadin’s popularity isn’t limited to Miragoâne. In late June 2023, he was gifted with an armored SUV, paid for by unnamed members of Haiti’s diaspora. The purchase was organized by journalist Theriel Thelus. Muscadin expressed his gratitude to the diaspora for their support and confidence.

The FJKL is fundamentally a political group with the facade of a human rights organization.

Popular support from inside and outside of Haiti seem to be irrelevant factors in Madistin’s analysis. In a Magik 9 interview, Madistin said Muscadin is “not the solution to growing insecurity in the country.” He accused Muscadin of being a “legal bandit,” whose actions “can be much more dangerous than those of armed bandits.”

Madistin then took a line of attack often employed against Cherizier, saying “Muscadin is accompanied by a group of armed civilians. We do not know how this group operates. Where do the weapons and ammunition used by Muscadin come from?” Should the allegation that Muscadin arms a vigilance brigade with guns confiscated from gangs or purchased in the U.S. be held against him?

Unsurprisingly, Pierre Espérance and the RNDDH have also criticized Muscadin, saying he is “accompanied by heavily armed civilians” in “possession, illegal weapons.” RNDDH denounced Muscadin because he “executes people, whom he presents as bandits, after subjecting them to hasty interrogation[s].” Espérance called Muscadin “a delinquent, member of the G9, working for the PHTK.” (Muscadin denied all the charges in a soon to be published Aug. 30 interview with Haïti Liberté and Redacted.)

Espérance is unconcerned with understanding the underlying reasons for Muscadin’s broad, popular support. The editors at Press Lakay, however, seem to have this understanding, stating in an editorial that Muscadin is “widely regarded as one of the most effective government commissioners in the Republic.” They argued that “any attempt to remove him from office would be risky,” pointing out that no actions were taken by Dorcé before he was dismissed from his post.

The FJKL is a political organization with the facade of a human rights group

Violence perpetrated by oligarch-backed armed gangs, which function as paramilitary groups, has fractured Haiti’s capital. The often-cited statistic that 80% of Port-au-Prince is controlled by gangs is misleading. A majority of Port-au-Prince is controlled by oligarch-backed gangs who often function as paramilitary groups. They oppose vigilance brigades and anti-crime groups like the FRG9, Bwa Kale, and local leaders like Muscadin.

Despite the battles that have raged between the FRG9 and the G-Pèp gangs over most of the past two years, three major truces have been negotiated in the past two months: 1) between Ti Bwa (Krisla) and Grand Ravine (Ti Lapli) with Village de Dieu (Izo); 2) between Brooklyn (Gabriel) in Cité Soleil and Iscard (Belekou) with Mathias (Boston); and 3) between Belair (Toto Alexandre and Kempes Sanon) and lower Delmas (Cherizier).

Cherizier has told Haïti Liberté that “these are not alliances, but peace accords.” Nonetheless, many media pundits are presenting the peace deals as a de facto alliance between the anti-crime FRG9 and the criminal gang federation G-Pèp.

The criminal gangs now extend well beyond Port-au-Prince into rural areas, threatening agriculture and local food supplies. Furthermore, insecurity and the threat of violence prevents what produce is grown from being transported. With more than a third of the population facing acute hunger, access to food is vital.

These armed gangs have destabilized Haiti, creating the justification for a foreign intervention which Henry requested to shore up his rule. This underlines Boulos’ support for G-Pep-associated gangs and his support for Ariel Henry. Boulos, like many Haitian oligarchs, wants a foreign military force to invade and occupy Haiti and protect his businesses.

Bwa Kale and the FRG9 are a result, in part, of the political class’ inability to organize a credible transitional government and force Henry out of office. They are, as Haïti Liberté director Berthony Dupont explained, “organic, autonomous, virtually spontaneous movements.” They are a response not only to the daily acts of depraved violence committed by oligarch-backed armed gangs but to the political void that has led to Henry’s uninterrupted reign as a U.S.-backed dictator.

This political leadership void has led to the rise of local leaders who defend their communities. Bwa Kale may be leaderless. There are, however, several local leaders who helped to organize vigilance brigades in their communities as part of the Bwa Kale movement.

All had come to a similar conclusion: Armed resistance to criminal gangs is necessary. The state has long abandoned its responsibility to eradicate gang violence and protect citizens from violence.

The PNH are unwilling or incapable of challenging criminal gangs. Consequently, dozens – perhaps more – of PNH officers have chosen to join or collaborate with FRG9 or their local vigilance brigade, recognizing the impotence of PNH leadership and the immediate need to rid their neighborhoods of criminal gangs.

Indeed, on Jun. 24, 2023 the Marien Patriotic Initiative (Initiative Patriote Marien – IPAM) published a statement calling for “the organization of vigilance brigades throughout the nation to protect the population and combat the gangs, murderers, kidnappers, and corrupt elements of the Ariel Henry regime.” IPAM is a collective of representatives of 33 local committees in the North and North-East regions of Haiti.

The FJKL is fundamentally a political group with the facade of a human rights organization. Whether it’s to Haitian oligarchs like Réginald Boulos or the U.S. government, the FJKL is committed to its benefactors and the class allegiances of its leadership.

The FJKL, like the RNDDH, is not a credible human rights organization.


Travis Ross is a teacher based in Montreal, Québec. He is also the co-editor of the Canada-Haiti Information Project at canada-haiti.ca . Travis has written for Haiti Liberté, Black Agenda Report, The CanadaFiles, TruthOut, and rabble.ca. He can be reached on Twitter.

The Open Eyes Foundation (FJKL) Is Not a Credible Human Rights Group

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At an FJKL press conference in 2018, executive director Marie Yolène Gilles (center left) and president Samuel Madistin (center right).

Marie Yolène Gilles was invited to address the United Nations Security Council on Feb. 20, 2023. She was representing the Fondation Je Klere (FJKL or Open Eyes Foundation), a human rights group of which she is the executive director.

Gilles told the Security Council that the FJKL “aims to promote and protect human rights in Haiti through its program for the monitoring of public institutions such as Parliament, the judicial and penal systems, the executive, and the police. It conducts inquiries and denounce[s] grave human rights violations, and it provides legal assistance to the voiceless and the underprivileged.”

Gilles provided an overview of the various crises facing Haiti, including gang violence, corruption, sexual assault, and a “grassroots uprising” against the Haitian National Police’s (PNH) leadership, whom she accuses of being led by a “mafia sector.”

She views the UN as a partner, stating in her speech that the Security Council “must contribute to the success of the transition period in order to ensure a return to democratic order,” implying that the UN should have a role in installing a transitional government in Haiti.

FJKL’s partnership with the U.S. government

Gilles’ rise to become the head of Haiti’s second most prominent human rights group is intertwined with the growing partnership between FJKL and Washington.

FJKL partnered with the U.S. Embassy in Haiti to hold a series of conferences on “fighting corruption” in Haiti on Feb. 9-10, 2023 at the El Rancho Hotel in Pétionville.

Marie Yolène Gilles (2nd from right) with her RNDDH colleagues, including Pierre Espérance (2nd from left), at the U.S. Embassy in 2012 when she received its Woman of Courage Award Photo: Alterpresse

FJKL president Samuel Madistin hosted the event, which U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Haiti Eric Stromayer attended. Speaking on behalf of the U.S. government, he said “we are proud to partner with Haitian civil society, press, and leaders to support anti-corruption work and activism, and we applaud the courageous work that anti-corruption advocates do every day.”

Gilles has been recognized before by the U.S. Embassy as an advocate, when she worked for Pierre Espérance at the National Networks for the Defense of Human Rights (RNDDH), Haiti’s foremost “human rights” group.

In 2012, Gilles received a “Woman of Courage of Haiti 2012” award (Femme de Courage d’Haiti 2012) from Daniel Foote, who was then working as the U.S. Embassy’s Chargé d’Affaires in Haiti. Foote said Gilles was an “example for all Haitians,” demonstrating an “unwavering commitment to the ideals of the Haitian revolution and of the Republic.”  At the time, Gilles was the RNDDH’s head of programs.

Gilles parts ways with Pierre Espérance and the RNDDH

Gilles left the RNDDH in 2017, following her accusations that Pierre Espérance, the organization’s director, had taken 1.5 million gourdes from the government’s Bureau de Monétisation des Programmes d’Aide au Développement (BMPAD), which was responsible for managing Haiti’s Petrocaribe account and social security administration (l’Office National d’Assurance Vieillesse or ONA).

In her resignation letter, Gilles cited several reasons for leaving the RNDDH. She argued that her credibility would be “tarnished” if she remained an RNDDH program director because Espérance had violated the organization’s rule against taking money from the State.

In addition, she was critical of Espérance’s willingness to take funds from Digicel, a company of which RNDDH had been critical in the past. She also accused Espérance of failing to pay taxes or contribute to an employee retirement fund over several years.

When Espérance was confronted with the accusation that he took 1.5 million gourdes from BMPAD, he initially denied receiving the funds. Gilles claims Espérance also lied to other RNDDH members when he was asked about taking the funds. Then a photo of the cheque began circulating on social media, forcing Espérance to admit he took the money.

At the time of Gilles’ departure, RNDDH’s program director Vilès Alizar told the press that the incident was an opportunity to “reaffirm our vision” as an organization and promised a “detailed report” on how the various funds had been used.

Sixteen months later, Alizar left the RNDDH with no report having been published. He denounced in the press the “bad practices” of “leaders of the organization,” saying that despite attempts to reform the RNDDH, he “realize[d] that these provisions have proved insufficient because of resistance“ from leadership, who have “refused to undertake reforms.”

Gilles worked for the RNDDH during the 2004 coup d’état against Aristide and Lavalas

Gilles’ actions could lead one to assume she was taking the moral and ethical high road by refusing to be a part of a human rights organization that violated its own rules. Espérance had not only lied about receiving the money from BMPAD but was also taking funds from the Petrocaribe program, under which 40% of the revenues from the sale of Venezuelan oil went into a state fund to pay for social programs. Petrocaribe was not meant to supplement U.S.-backed human rights groups. The program’s intent was to provide the Haitian state with funds for development and social welfare projects.

A careful review of Gilles’ role in the RNDDH, however, reveals a sharply different picture.

Lawyer Brian Concannon of the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti: NCHR-Haiti “became increasingly politicized and, in the wake of the 2004 coup d’état, it cooperated with the IGH in persecuting Lavalas activists.”

Gilles began working at RNDDH in 2003, when it was the National Coalition for Haitian Rights–Haiti (NCHR-Haiti), later renamed RNDDH.

The RNDDH played a key role in the coup d’etat that forced President Jean-Bertrand Aristide from power in 2004. Aristide had won the 2000 election with almost 92% of the popular vote.

In that coup, paramilitaries forced from power Aristide and over 1000 elected officials from his Fanmi Lavalas (Lavalas Family) party across Haiti.

A 2006 Lancet study revealed that “during the 22-month period of the U.S.-backed Interim Government, 8,000 people were murdered in the greater Port-au Prince area alone. 35,000 women and girls were raped or sexually assaulted, more than half of the victims were children.”

Mario Joseph, director of the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI) argues that “if the Lancet cited 8,000 murders in Port-au-Prince between 2004 and 2006, we have to double this number to reflect what happened throughout the country.”

Backed by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), an agency cutout of the CIA, and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), NCHR-Haiti engaged in a “close working partnership with [de facto Prime Minister Gérard] Latortue’s dictatorship,” said Richard Sanders, a Global Fellow at the Wilson Center’s Canada Institute. NCHR-Haiti “became, in effect, an arm of the illegal ‘interim’ government,” he concluded.

the Latortue regime “had an agreement with NCHR-Haiti to prosecute anyone the organization denounced.”

Brian Concannon, director of the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH), described NCHR-Haiti as a “ferocious critic” of Aristide’s government and an “ally” of the illegal regime, formally called the Interim Government of Haiti (IGH).

According to Concannon, the Latortue regime “had an agreement with NCHR-Haiti to prosecute anyone the organization denounced.”

“People perceived to support Haiti’s constitutional government or Fanmi Lavalas, the political party of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, [were] systematically persecuted from late February [2004] through the present. In many cases, the de facto government of Prime Minister Gérard Latortue is directly responsible for the persecution,” Concannon explained during the coup.

NCHR-Haiti “became increasingly politicized and, in the wake of the 2004 coup d’état, it cooperated with the IGH in persecuting Lavalas activists,” Concannon later wrote in The Jurist. “The persecution became so flagrant that NCHR-Haiti’s former parent organization, New York-based NCHR, publicly repudiated the Haitian group and asked it to change its name.”

Several delegations visited Haiti after the coup to investigate alleged human rights violations there. Their reports reveal a so-called “human rights organization,” funded by imperialist governments, that worked closely with the Latortue regime with impunity.

The Quixote Center sent a delegation to Haiti led by retired Caribbean Studies professor Tom Reeves. Upon returning from Haiti, Reeves wrote an article explaining the delegation’s findings in which he described NCHR-Haiti as “completely partisan: anti-Lavalas, anti-Aristide. This is simply not proper for a group calling itself a ‘Haitian Rights’ organization.”

In April 2004, the National Lawyers Guild sent their second delegation to Haiti. One of the report’s eight “Unanimous Statements and Recommendations,” was an unequivocal condemnation of the group: “We condemn the National Coalition for Haitian Rights (NCHR) in Haiti for not maintaining its impartiality as a human rights organization.”

The Haiti Accompaniment Project (HAP) visited Haiti in June 2004. The HAP delegates were also part of the Haiti Action Committee, based in California.

The HAP report notes that in 2004, the NCHR-Haiti “helped develop support for the coup with exaggerated reports of human rights violations by supporters of the elected government. At the same time, they downplayed or denied the much more massive violations of the de facto regime and its paramilitary allies.”

The report also explains how NCHR-Haiti denounced supporters of Aristide’s government. According to HAP, NCHR offered no evidence for the accusations it leveled against FL supporters, resulting in “illegal arrest, incarceration and sometimes the disappearance of the accused.”

The HAP delegation met with a grassroots victims rights group who shared that they were “dismayed that the outside world still looked upon NCHR as a credible independent voice.” They told the delegates that “NCHR was now working hand-in-hand with the post-coup Minister of Justice in carrying out illegal arrests and detentions.”

The HAP delegation concluded bluntly that “they are not [an] independent human rights group.”

Marie Yolène Gilles, interrogator of political prisoners for the Latortue regime

Gilles is named specifically by several human rights delegations and reports for her role as an interrogator who worked with the PNH. Multiple witnesses accuse Gilles of bribing victims for false testimony to frame FL leaders, specifically leaders like Yvon Neptune and Amanus Mayette. NCHR-Haiti /RNDDH targeted them on behalf of the Latortue coup regime.

In an open letter sent on Oct. 19, 2006 to Justice Minister René Magloire, Mario Joseph and several other human rights lawyers demanded the release of FL political prisoners, including former parliamentarian Amanus Mayette. In the letter, Joseph identified Gilles as the NCHR-Haiti executive who interrogated Mayette at the Central Directorate of the Judicial police (DCPJ).

Former Fanmi Lavalas deputy Amanus Mayette, imprisoned without trial from 2004 to 2006, claims that Gilles offered him a bribe if he would testify against other Fanmi Lavalas leaders after the 2004 coup.

The letter also highlights NCHR-Haiti/RNDDH’s role in the Latortue regime’s “tenacious program of vengeance” which caused “caused considerable harm to the political prisoners,” noting that “it was on the basis of a mere press release” that Mayette was arrested.

Joseph refers to NCHR-Haiti/RNDDH as an “injustice machine” that was invented via Canadian government funding. He argued that the RNDDH accusations “are political,” resulting in “more than a hundred Fanmi Lavalas grassroots activists” being “arrested and detained with no charge, and no trial.”

In a separate interview, Joseph charges that RNDDH fabricated allegations against three elected Fanmi Lavalas leaders as part of a “disinformation campaign.” Joseph represented these leaders as a defense lawyer against allegations of a massacre in La Scierie (Saint Marc).

The HAP delegation interviewed several political prisoners whom Gilles visited in jail on the pretext of “defending their human rights.”

The HAP delegates interviewed Roland Dauphin, a customs worker, whom Gilles sought out at the Delmas 33 police station, offering a deal for information.

According to his testimony in the HAP report, Gilles “urged him to implicate the Prime Minister [Yvon Neptune] and Minister of the Interior [Jocelerme Privert] in an alleged massacre of Aristide opponents in St. Marc, promising him money and safe haven in the U.S.. When he balked, Dauphin reported that Gilles made a phone call to show she had the authority to deliver the deal. According to Dauphin, Gilles spoke English during the telephone call and identified the other party as a U.S. Embassy official. Dauphin had nothing to say, and Gilles left her business card in case he ‘changed his mind.’”

Deputy Amanus Mayette was also interviewed by HAP delegates. He told them that “Gilles offered him a similar bribe. According to Mayette, she pledged to secure his release, provided he would ‘name names.’”

Gilles is also accused of collaborating with PNH leadership who were complicit in the coup.

Gilles spoke English during the telephone call and identified the other party as a U.S. Embassy official.

Rospide Pétion, who headed Airport Security prior to the coup, said in his testimony to the HAP delegation that he was arrested and interrogated by de facto PNH chief Léon Charles. Pétion claims Charles threatened him with prison and that he was taken to another room where he was told to speak with an NCHR-Haiti representative. Gilles appeared, reiterating the charges. Pétion said Gilles then took over the interrogation, saying “we know you crashed the radio tower” (referring to a radio broadcast tower which had been sabotaged).

Gilles’ role as an interrogator who attempted to elicit false testimony to incriminate Lavalas leaders for crimes they did not commit offers a different perspective on her 2012 award from the U.S. Embassy for her supposed “unwavering commitment towards the ideals of the Haitian revolution and of the Republic.”

According to a COHA report, “countless individuals, many whose only crime was a loose affiliation with Aristide’s Fanmi Lavalas party, were arrested by the interim government based on false accusations entered by the NCHR-Haiti.”

Gilles was part of the process of persecuting Lavalas, framing its leaders for manufactured “genocides,” and terrorizing Haiti’s poor majority who wanted their democracy back. She did not leave when NCHR-Haiti enthusiastically applied for and received funding from the governments who orchestrated the 2004 coup. As Brian Concannon points out, NCHR-Haiti was “supported by USAID and by other wealthy governments [Canada and France], has been systematically biased in their human rights reporting, in terms of over reporting accusations against Lavalas members and under-reporting or ignoring accusations of persecution of Lavalas members.”

Nor did Gilles quit when the RNDDH began receiving annual funding from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which, according to NED co-founder Allan Weinstein, does “a lot of what … was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA.” Although she worked as a reporter for the anti-imperialist newsletter Haiti-Info during the 1991-1994 coup d’état, in the 2004-2006 coup Gilles elicited false testimony to frame Fanmi Lavalas leaders for crimes the RNDDH had manufactured and played a role in the destruction of Haiti’s democracy, while the country’s sovereignty was violated by imperialist governments.

Samuel Madistin, President of FJKL

Gilles runs FJKL along with its President, Samuel Madistin, a practicing lawyer.

After representing the Artibonite Department as a Senator in the 1990s, Madistin returned to politics in 2015 when he sought to be the presidential candidate of the Popular Patriotic Dessalinien Movement (MOPOD), a political coalition-turned-party.

Madistin’s rival for MOPOD’s nomination was former First Lady Mirlande Manigat, who is currently the president of Ariel Henry’s High Transitional Council (HCT).

Former Senator Turneb Delpé, a MOPOD member, described the party as a mix of self-identified “Christian democrats,” socialists, “liberalists,” and nationalists.

Madistin lost to Manigat. Party members had reason to believe Manigat was a strong candidate. She won the first round of voting in the 2010 election, only to have the U.S. State department intervene in the election so their chosen candidate, Michel Martelly, won the second round in what is widely regarded as a rigged election.

A month later, Manigat withdrew her candidacy. In a letter to party members, she said “the elections as they are programmed, announced, and set with an impossible timetable, portend a fake vote which does not respect democratic principles.”

The nomination was then handed back to Madistin, who enthusiastically took on the role, officially launching his campaign a few months later. Madistin’s platform included many promises of investment in infrastructure, agriculture, public health, energy, reforestation, education, and governance. No details were provided on how all these projects would be funded. In his acceptance speech, Madistin framed his ideals as that of a social-democrat. He told party members that Haiti needed a “united, sovereign, democratic and popular state …that gives itself the means to fight effectively against corruption and social inequalities.” A generous plan with no details on how it might be implemented.

Ignoring Manigat’s assessment of the likelihood of foreign meddling in the 2015-16 election, Madistin ran for the presidency, competing with 54 other candidates. He lost. Only 18% of the voters voted in the election – approximately 1.5 million Haitians. Madistin acquired approximately 13,000 votes – less than 1% of the total.

The 2015-16 voting brought to power Jovenel Moïse and was widely regarded as a sham election. Like so many other politicians and political parties, Madistin tacitly endorsed the election by choosing to run, solidifying PHTK rule over Haiti.

The year after Moïse was inaugurated as Haiti’s president, Madistin and Gilles founded the FJKL in May 2018 (about one year after Gilles left the RNDDH).

It is unclear where FJKL’s funding comes from. From her years at RNDDH, Gilles has shown a clear willingness to receive funding from imperialist agencies, including the NED, USAID, the Canadian government, and the French government.

Meanwhile, Madistin is the lawyer of Reginald Boulos, one of Haiti’s richest bourgeois oligarchs. This suggests another likely source of funding for the FJKL.

Prominent Haitian businessman Reginald Boulos is accused of financially supporting paramilitaries to force Aristide from power in the 2004 U.S.-backed coup d’etat.

Reginald Boulos, a prominent founder and member of the NED-organized Group of 184 during the 2004 coup, is accused of financially supporting paramilitaries to force Aristide from power in the 2004 U.S.-backed coup d’etat. In an interview with Peter Hallward, paramilitary leader Guy Philip was asked if Boulos and other oligarchs had subsidized his movement. In response, Philippe said “Yes we had meetings with various businessmen and they helped us… they contributed around $200,000 (US) to buy arms and ammunition.”

According to his Linkedin page, “Boulos is past and current President of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and a member of the Haitian American Chamber of Commerce, the Haitian Medical Association, and the Haitian Association of Public Health.”

A multimillionaire, Boulos is also “CEO of Boulos Investment Group, which includes Autoplaza S.A., the second largest car dealership; Delimart S.A, Haiti’s largest supermarket chain; Pehacheve, a leading pharmaceutical distribution company; Multipresse S.A. radio station which he co-founded, and Le Nouveau Matin, one of the two daily newspapers in Haiti.”

A trained medical doctor, Boulos is implicated in the death of 87 Haitian children after his company, Pharval Pharmaceuticals, produced a poisonous cough syrup that was distributed in Port-au-Prince’s poor neighborhoods. An Ayibopost report from 2018 claims “at least 77 children aged one to 13 months perished in this tragedy,” while another 10 survivors suffer from permanent disabilities.

Boulos is also linked to another episode of medical malpractice against Haitian children. In 1996, the Haiti Information Project reported on a case of more than 2,000 babies in Cité Soleil who were given an irregularly high dose of an experimental measles vaccine. This “U.S. government test” was conducted by the U.S.-funded Centres pour le Développement et la Santé (CDS), which Boulos then headed.

Richard Sanders describes the Group of 184 as “the most powerful coalition of ‘civil society’ organizations in Haiti during the lead up to the 2004 coup.” It was dominated by Haiti’s business elite who were funded by American, Canadian and European government “aid” and “democracy promotion” agencies. Sanders explained that “the G184 coordinated and led the successful campaign to destabilize Haiti’s elected government and depose President Aristide.”

Tom Reeves criticized the Group of 184 of being “little more than a list of well-known pro-elite and pro-business apologists in Haiti, most of whom have virtually no public following.”

As reported by Haiti Liberté, Boulos also took it upon himself to arm the de facto regime’s police force, which violently repressed protests demanding exiled President Aristide’s return, killing scores of demonstrators and bystanders.

Madistin is Reginald and Rudolphe Boulos’ legal representative

Madistin has worked as Boulos’ attorney on several occasions. He has represented members of the Boulos family for well over a decade and Reginald Boulos’ brother, Rudolphe Boulos, as far back as 2008.

Rudolphe Boulos was found to be criminally liable for the aforementioned case of poisoning of 87 Haitian children as he was president of Pharval Pharmaceuticals at the time. Judge Jean Wilner Morin sentenced Boulos to six months in prison and ordered him to pay three million gourdes in damages to each of the victims. This judgment followed an exhaustive investigation published in the Journal Public Health Report that showed Pharval had not followed standard procedure or checked that the ingredients were certified.

Rudolphe Boulos never served a single day in prison. It is also unclear whether he paid the victims and their families the amounts owed. Rudolphe Boulos left Haiti to escape conviction following the judgment.

Madistin filed an appeal on behalf of Boulos and refused to comment to the media.

Madistin more recently represented Reginald Boulos when the oligarch was scheduled to be heard by a commission of inquiry from the General Directorate of the Haitian government’s Unit for the Fight Against Corruption (ULCC) on Jul. 2, 2021. According to a report by Haïti Liberté’s Isabelle Papillon, the ULCC was investigating two large loans Boulos received for a project to build apartments (RBI), and his Delimart supermarket chain.

Papillon explained further that “Jenley Marc Jean-Baptiste, ONA’s General Director, supported ULCC’s initiative to investigate the dispute between ONA and RBI. In a Jul. 2 note, Jean-Baptiste wrote that ONA “vehemently condemns the misappropriation of its funds in the amount of one million U.S. dollars by the company Real Business Investment SA, a company belonging to Mr. Pierre Réginald Boulos, as part of a fictitious project for the construction of social housing in Fermathe, set up in 2018.”

Boulos refused to show up for the hearing and a warrant for his arrest was issued. His bank accounts in Haiti were frozen.

Two days later, Jul. 7, 2021, President Moïse was assassinated. The charges against Boulos were quickly dropped by judge Bernard Sainvil without ONA’s lawyers in attendance, effectively stopping the investigation into Boulos’ “fictitious” social housing project in its tracks.

At the time, Boulos was president of the “Third Way Movement for Haiti” (MTVAyiti), a political party founded in December of 2019. Boulos founded MTVAyiti to challenge President Jovenel Moise after their falling out in the summer of 2018.

Responding to the ULCC and ONA, Boulos posted the following statement on Jul. 3, 2021: “It’s not the first time they have used lies and manipulation to weaponize the justice system against a political opponent,” he wrote in Kreyòl. “It’s not the first time they’ve invented fake cases to cover true cases of crime and corruption. Our eyes are open! One day will be the day! The struggle continues for another Haiti!”

When the loan was first reported on in the summer of 2018, it was quickly criticized. The loan facilitated Boulos’ purchase of a Nissan dealership in Port-au-Prince. In an article for Le Nouvelliste, financial analyst Guy Laudé said the “two institution leaders created a tailor-made product, without any legal reference” and was likely developed to supplement “the company’s lack of capital.”

So, while acting as president of so-called “human rights” group, FJKL, Madistin was also representing an oligarch, who was credibly accused of corruption.

(To be continued)


Travis Ross is a teacher based in Montreal, Québec. He is also the co-editor of the Canada-Haiti Information Project at canada-haiti.ca . Travis has written for Haiti Liberté, Black Agenda Report, The Canada Files, TruthOut, and rabble.ca. He can be reached on Twitter.

L’impérialisme canadien en Haïti (3)

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L'ancien député Lavalas Printemps Bélizaire est suspecté dans le meurtre en 2018 du journaliste Vladimir Legagneur et a été enregistré déclarant qu'il « a incendié des postes de police et tué des gens ».

Groupes de la diaspora haïtienne au Canada : rançons, exactions et désespoir

Certains membres de la diaspora haïtienne changent d’avis et approuvent une sorte d’intervention étrangère dans leur pays d’origine. Les enlèvements en Haïti ont un effet direct sur les membres de la famille vivant à l’étranger. S’exprimant lors d’une manifestation organisée par Debout pour la dignité, le pasteur Joseph Jr Clorméus de l’Église de Dieu de la Prophétie a déclaré que les demandes de rançon parviennent à des proches à l’étranger, qui doivent organiser des collectes de fonds. Il dit que ses partisans se voient demander 420 000 dollars américains pour la libération de sept personnes. Il dit que ce n’est “que la pointe de l’iceberg”.

Le militant de Solidarité Québec-Haïti (SQH), Jean Saint-Vil, a décrit les effets des enlèvements et des rançons sur les membres de la famille de la diaspora il y a près de deux ans dans une présentation publiée sur Facebook. Les Haïtiens de la diaspora ont été contraints d’hypothéquer ou de vendre leurs maisons, de contracter des emprunts et de vider leur compte bancaire pour payer les demandes de rançon.

Après des années d’extorsion depuis l’étranger et de voir leurs proches terrorisés par des gangs armés, certains Haïtiens de la diaspora ont le sentiment qu’une intervention étrangère est la seule option. Comme l’a expliqué M. Flaubert Duclair de Debout pour la Dignité, « nous ne voulons pas d’une invasion militaire » mais « l’horreur actuelle ne laisse pas d’autre choix ».

Ce point de vue est partagé par d’autres membres de la diaspora et est amplifié par les HSH. Dans un récent essai invité pour le New York Times, le Dr Jean W. Pape, professeur au Weill Cornell Medical College de New York, a écrit : « Les Haïtiens ne peuvent pas surmonter cette crise… sans intervention étrangère ». Pape a expliqué que, de son point de vue, les Haïtiens « ne voient pas de solution à notre crise sans intervention étrangère. Nous avons besoin de forces internationales expérimentées pour soutenir et former notre force de police nationale et assurer la sécurité alors que nous travaillons à la reconstruction de notre gouvernement.

L’ONU et la CARICOM continuent de conspirer pour empêcher Bwa Kale de réussir

Henry a récemment signé un “Plan-cadre de coopération pour le développement durable des Nations Unies” avec l’ONU. L’ONU affirme que cette “feuille de route conjointe” est “conçue pour améliorer la cohérence, l’efficacité et l’efficience du soutien de l’ONU au gouvernement”. Les « domaines de travail prioritaires convenus comprennent la gouvernance, la sécurité et l’état de droit, la transformation économique inclusive, les services sociaux et l’environnement ».

Le successeur d’Helen La Lime, Maria Isabel Salvador, a commenté le plan, disant de façon inquiétante que “le succès d’Haïti dépendra du succès des efforts du BINUH pour établir ce cadre de coopération”. Lors d’un récent briefing au Conseil de sécurité, Salvador a déclaré “nous devons trouver des moyens innovants pour définir la force de soutien à la Police nationale haïtienne”. Elle a cité la lettre d’octobre de Guterres, approuvant un “besoin urgent de déploiement” d’une “Force internationale spécialisée”.

Tout en soutenant un dictateur, l’ONU travaille sur plusieurs fronts pour saper la souveraineté haïtienne et imposer une intervention étrangère. Après avoir rencontré Guterres, la CARICOM a annoncé que les dirigeants haïtiens étaient invités à une conférence en Jamaïque à la mi-juin. La CARICOM a également annoncé qu’un « Groupe de personnalités éminentes » (EPG) sera formé pour mener les négociations. Le secrétariat de la CARICOM a nommé les membres de l’EPG comme l’ancien Premier ministre des Bahamas Perry Christie, l’ancien Premier ministre jamaïcain Bruce Golding et leur homologue de Sainte-Lucie, le Dr Kenny D. Anthony. L’EPG est une sorte de contrefaçon du “Lima Group”.

Les gouvernements des Bahamas et de la Jamaïque soutiennent une intervention militaire en Haïti.

Quels que soient les individus de la coalition de Montana ou du HCT de Henry sélectionnés pour le gouvernement de transition imminente, Washington et le CORE groupe conserveront le contrôle d’Haïti. La direction de l’Accord de Montana est une opposition contrôlée face à Henry, qui est à son tour une marionnette soutenue par le gouvernement américain.

Comme Cherizier l’a expliqué dans une interview présentée dans l’épisode 3 d’Une autre vision, “l’intérêt de la classe politique traditionnelle, l’intérêt de la société civile, est de prendre le pouvoir sans que les conditions des masses les plus pauvres ne changent jamais… [Ils] envoient leurs enfants à l’école à l’étranger. Ils ont tous une couverture sanitaire internationale, donc quand ils tombent malades, ils reçoivent des soins médicaux à l’étranger. » Ces personnes, tant les partis traditionnels que la société civile, incarnent l’apartheid. Cherizier soutient que « ce ne sont pas des patriotes, ils n’aiment pas ce pays. Ils voient juste Haïti comme leur petit magasin qui leur rapporte de l’argent pour vivre avec leur famille – avec la classe politique et la bourgeoisie qui sont tout aussi puantes et corrompues qu’eux ».

Feu le militant pro-démocratie Patrick Elie : « [La Famille Lavalas] « c’est ce que je qualifierais d’organisation charismatique, qui dépend strictement de son chef et après ça vous n’avez rien en termes de structure et de capacité à formuler une stratégie politique. »
La violence perpétrée par des gangs armés soutenus par des oligarques, qui fonctionnent comme des groupes paramilitaires, a fracturé la capitale. La statistique souvent citée selon laquelle 80% de Port-au-Prince est contrôlé par des gangs est trompeuse. La majorité de Port-au-Prince est contrôlée par des gangs soutenus par des oligarques qui fonctionnent souvent comme des groupes paramilitaires. Ils s’opposent aux brigades de vigilance et aux groupes anti-criminalité comme le FRG9 et, de plus en plus, le mouvement Bwa Kale.

Ces gangs armés déstabilisent Haïti et créent la justification d’une intervention étrangère, qu’Henry a demandée pour consolider son pouvoir.

Ces gangs armés et groupes paramilitaires s’étendent maintenant bien au-delà de Port-au-Prince dans les zones rurales, menaçant l’agriculture et l’approvisionnement alimentaire local. De plus, l’insécurité et la menace de violence empêchent le transport des produits cultivés. Avec plus d’un tiers de la population confrontée à la faim aiguë, l’accès à la nourriture est vital.

La crise s’aggrave. Bwa Kale est en partie le résultat de l’incapacité de la classe politique à organiser un gouvernement de transition crédible et à forcer Henry à démissionner. C’est une réponse, non seulement aux actes quotidiens de violence dépravée commis par des gangs armés soutenus par des oligarques, mais au vide politique qui a conduit au règne ininterrompu d’Henry en tant que dictateur soutenu par les États-Unis.

Ce vide de leadership politique a conduit à la montée en puissance de dirigeants locaux comme Muscadin et Cherizier qui défendent leurs communautés. Pendant ce temps, le président par intérim proposé par le Montana, Fritz Alphonse Jean, admet avoir passé des semaines barricadé dans sa maison, à l’abri des actes de violence quotidiens perpétrés contre les Haïtiens.

La violence des gangs criminels armés est vécue très différemment selon la classe sociale en Haïti. La majorité pauvre n’avait aucun moyen de se défendre avant la mise en place du mouvement Bwa Kale. Ce n’est pas le cas des petites classes moyennes et supérieures. Les riches Haïtiens ont d’autres options que de barricader leur maison, notamment l’embauche de sociétés de sécurité, l’achat d’arsenaux et le paiement de policiers pour protéger leurs quartiers.

Solidarité internationale

Les Canadiens qui cherchent à montrer leur solidarité avec les Haïtiens ont des options. Les syndicats haïtiens se mobilisent et recherchent la solidarité internationale.

Les syndicats se sont réunis à Ouanaminthe en janvier avec des représentants de syndicats du monde entier. Le rassemblement a abouti à la “Déclaration de Ouanaminthe”, qui appelle à “la solidarité internationale en général, et la solidarité syndicale en particulier”. Il rejette également l’intervention militaire internationale, déclarant que “toute intervention armée internationale irait à l’encontre du droit des Haïtiens à l’autodétermination”.

Le vice-président régional du Québec du Syndicat canadien de la fonction publique (SCFP), Richard Delisle, a assisté à la rencontre. Répondant à l’appel à la solidarité internationale entre les syndicats, Delisle a déclaré que « le SCFP a écrit à la ministre des Affaires étrangères, Mélanie Joly, pour demander au gouvernement canadien de respecter la démocratie et l’autodétermination haïtiennes, et de rester à l’écart de toute intervention militaire ». Un autre appel à soutenir les syndicats a récemment été lancé par le groupe montréalais de solidarité haïtienne REHMONCO.

Les Canadiens peuvent également soutenir Haïti en demandant à leur gouvernement de cesser de soutenir le premier ministre de facto Ariel Henry. Ils peuvent aussi l’appeler ce qu’il est – un dictateur soutenu par Washington et le CORE Group.

Dans une déclaration du 12 juin 2023 appelant à la solidarité avec Haïti, SQH a appelé à la fin de « l’ingérence étrangère [qui] a été et reste la principale source persistante de crimes violents liés aux troubles politiques dans la société haïtienne ». Selon le communiqué, SQH « a accueilli avec prudence l’accord de Montana mais l’a également critiqué ». On ne sait pas quelles sont ces critiques. SQH a souligné qu’ils « attendent et encouragent les signataires de l’accord de Montana à faire plus pour se connecter avec les masses en difficulté ». SQH encourage également ses alliés à « écouter et entendre [les] voix authentiques » des Haïtiens.

Le soutien de SQH au groupe Montana contraste avec celui de nombreux anti-impérialistes haïtiens tels que MOLEGHAF, une organisation populaire qui s’est récemment associée à la Black Alliance for Peace (BAP). Le secrétaire général du MOLEGHAF, Oxygène David, est très critique à l’égard des dirigeants de Montana, déclarant qu’ils “n’ont rien fait de plus que plonger les masses plus profondément dans l’exclusion, la pauvreté et la misère“. (Les raisons du départ de MOLEGHAF de l’accord de Montana ont été expliquées en détail dans les colonnes du journal Haïti Liberté). Le co-coordinateur de l’équipe Haïti/Amérique du BAP, le Dr Jemima Pierre, a également dénoncé le groupe de l’Accord de Montana comme une “opposition bourgeoise”.

Les Canadiens devraient dénoncer activement la désinformation et la propagande diffusées par des groupes financés par les États-Unis comme le RNDDH, le FJKL, JURIMEDIA et l’OCAPH. Ces groupes opèrent en toute impunité et sont traités comme des sources légitimes d’information et d’opinion par les HSH et les gouvernements occidentaux.

Les Canadiens ne sont pas à l’abri de la propagande financée par les États-Unis, comme l’a expliqué Peter Biesterfeld dans son article sur l’incapacité des grands médias canadiens à informer le public sur la politique étrangère. Il soutient que « les consommateurs de nouvelles canadiens qui lisent, regardent et écoutent exclusivement les nouvelles grand public restent sous-informés » sur la politique étrangère canadienne. « Le journalisme grand public canadien autour des affaires haïtiennes », observe Biesterfeld, « s’appuie fortement sur les récits officiels fournis par des représentants du gouvernement occidental, des organisations de défense des droits de l’homme et des groupes de réflexion ». Lorsqu’ils citent des sources de ces « organisations de défense des droits de la personne », les grands médias canadiens ne mentionnent pas qu’elles sont financées par la NED ou une fondation pour le changement de régime comme l’Open Society Foundation.

De nombreux Haïtiens comprennent l’effet toxique de tels groupes sur le discours dans les pays occidentaux et la nécessité pour les Haïtiens de parler pour eux-mêmes à travers des mouvements comme Bwa Kale.

Il existe également des organisations aux États-Unis et en Haïti qui ont démontré leur capacité à faire pression efficacement dans un monde multipolaire et à obtenir des résultats.

L’Alliance noire pour la paix (BAP) et Haïti Liberté ont efficacement aidé à bloquer les efforts américains à l’ONU pour occuper Haïti sous le couvert d’une «force militaire spéciale». BAP a remis une lettre ouverte aux représentants de la République populaire de Chine et de la Fédération de Russie en octobre intitulée « Non à l’intervention militaire étrangère en Haïti ! Oui, à l’autodétermination haïtienne !

Après avoir alerté la délégation russe sur l’objectif de Washington d’intervenir militairement en Haïti, Haïti Liberté a fait une présentation anti-intervention devant le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU.

Ces efforts ont conduit la Russie et la Chine à bloquer Washington et les efforts du CORE groupe au Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU. Soutenir des efforts comme ceux-ci sur le front international peut avoir des effets directs et tangibles sur les efforts d’intervention en Haïti.

Le système de gouvernance actuel d’Haïti, dans lequel, selon Louis-Henri Mars, “les gangs renforcent la politique”, s’auto-entretient “parce que l’État et la société haïtienne ont si peu fait pour tant de quartiers délaissés et que de nombreux jeunes sont désespérés. ”

Le régime de sanctions du Canada, ainsi que le soutien du Premier ministre Trudeau à la PNH, n’ont fait que renforcer la position d’Ariel Henry, augmentant ainsi la souffrance des Haïtiens.

 

Bwa Kale montre que les Haïtiens essaient de briser ce cycle

Les blocages vaincus du FRG9 au terminal de Varreux soulignent l’effet profond qu’une force internationale aura sur Port-au-Prince et Haïti en général. En novembre 2022, seuls trois véhicules armés et quelques soldats de la PNH ont délogé et repoussé un groupe qui est régulièrement présenté dans le MSM comme redoutable et puissant. Le blocus visait à faire pression sur Henry pour qu’il démissionne, l’un des nombreux blocus autour de Port-au-Prince à l’époque. Le porte-parole du FRG9, Jimmy Cherizier, avait appelé Henry à démissionner, suggérant qu’un gouvernement de transition composé de représentants communautaires élus localement prenne le pouvoir. Ses efforts ont été contrecarrés par le Canada et l’ONU.

Ce cadre de soutien aux efforts de la PNH pour mettre fin à la violence des gangs dément également un facteur crucial. Les gangs criminels sont un symptôme, et non la cause profonde de la violence. Louis-Henri Mars, le directeur exécutif de Lakou Lapè, une organisation de consolidation de la paix, affirme que « tous les Haïtiens que je connais sont conscients qu’au cours des 20 dernières années, des ministres du gouvernement, des sénateurs et des délégués parlementaires ont livré de l’argent et des armes à des gangs ».

Bwa Kale cible actuellement les gangs criminels. André Charlier écrit que les Haïtiens maintenant « semblent brûler d’un furieux désir de refaire 1804 », se référant à la révolution haïtienne. Ceux au pouvoir qui financent et arment les gangs doivent se demander si, une fois les gangs éliminés, seront-ils les prochains ?

En décembre, le journaliste Kim Ives a déclaré au Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU : « La situation en Haïti ne peut être résolue par une intervention étrangère, la force militaire ou même des sanctions. Le peuple haïtien, agissant en toute souveraineté, doit être autorisé à régler ses propres problèmes ». Berthony Dupont, directeur d’Haïti Liberté, est d’accord : « ce n’est que par leur propre lutte qu’ils vaincront toutes les manœuvres et ingérences des impérialistes et de leurs laquais locaux ».

 

Une version antérieure de cet article a été publiée pour la première fois par The Canada Files. Travis Ross est un enseignant basé à Montréal, Québec. Il est également co-rédacteur en chef du projet d’information Canada-Haïti sur canada-haiti.ca. Travis a écrit pour Haïti Liberté, Black Agenda Report, TruthOut et rabble.ca. Il est joignable sur Twitter.

 

L’impérialisme canadien en Haïti (2)

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Emmanuela Douyon de Nou Pap Dòmi travaillait auparavant pour le National Democratic Institute (NDI), une branche du NED

Partie 2 : L’opposition contrôlée d’Haïti et le Global Fragility Act. Ceci est la deuxième partie de The Canada Files sur l’impérialisme canadien en Haïti contre la lutte de la base haïtienne pour se libérer de l’occupation occidentale.

 

Le Global Fragility Act

Le Canada a discrètement approuvé la Global Fragility Act (GFA) au début de 2020. Une seule déclaration de l’ambassade du Canada aux États-Unis a déclaré que le Canada « célébrait l’adoption » de la GFA. La déclaration poursuit en expliquant que l’ACM « s’aligne sur un certain nombre de priorités de développement et de politique étrangère du gouvernement du Canada ».

Comme l’a noté le journaliste Kim Ives dans un article récent, “bien que la GFA ait été adoptée avec un soutien bipartite sous Trump en 2019, elle est restée sous le radar”. Il explique que la GFA est “essentiellement une nouvelle alliance du” savoir-faire “de l’USAID avec le muscle du Pentagone”.

L’administration Biden a publié “La stratégie américaine pour prévenir les conflits et promouvoir la stabilité du plan stratégique décennal pour Haïti” le 24 mars 2023, affirmant qu’elle avait choisi Haïti pour “sa pertinence stratégique et sa proximité avec les États-Unis et la nécessité d’une approche à long terme plus coordonnée pour lutter contre les facteurs d’instabilité dans le pays”.

Pour y parvenir, les États-Unis prévoient «d’intégrer la diplomatie américaine, le développement et l’engagement du secteur de la sécurité en Haïti». En d’autres termes, le Département d’État, sa branche humanitaire, l’USAID et le Pentagone travailleront tous en étroite coordination.

Ives explique que « cela signifie que le nouveau complexe DOS/USAID/DOD prendra effectivement le contrôle d’Haïti, si Washington obtient ce qu’il veut, ramenant ainsi le pays d’une néo-colonie à une colonie virtuelle telle qu’elle était de 1915 à 1934, lorsque les Marines américains l’occupaient et la dirigeaient. Néanmoins, les États-Unis essaieraient de garder une façade haïtienne.

Dans le cadre de la GFA, ces « programmes pluriannuels » sont en fait des programmes « d’assistance à la sécurité planifiée » sur dix ans.

Dans une déclaration préparée à la commission des affaires étrangères de la Chambre, Jim Saenz, sous-secrétaire adjoint à la Défense pour la lutte contre les stupéfiants et la politique de stabilisation, a expliqué que le ministère de la Défense “jouera un rôle clé dans la planification et la mise en œuvre” de la GFA. « Le rôle du DoD dans la mise en œuvre de GFA est de soutenir les efforts du Département d’État en tant que chef de file, et de l’USAID » pour « s’assurer que les plans décennaux pour les pays et régions prioritaires alignent les buts, objectifs, plans et repères pertinents avec la politique du DoD », a expliqué Saenz.

Sans surprise, Susan Page, l’ex-chef de la MINUJUSTH susmentionnée, a approuvé la GFA, proposant dans son article pour le CFR que “les États-Unis et d’autres partenaires devraient commencer à planifier des programmes de développement pluriannuels” avec la direction du groupe de Montana dans le cadre de la GFA.

Le contexte plus large de la GFA a été expliqué lors de la mise en place de la loi. Frances Z. Brown, chercheur principal au Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, considère les «accords bilatéraux avec les États fragiles» de la GFA comme un moyen d’empêcher la Chine et la Russie de «s’attaquer à la faiblesse de la gouvernance», reflétant l’inquiétude de nombreux groupes de réflexion américains.

Jeffsky Poincy, responsable de programme chez Partners Global, a déclaré qu’il était “heureux qu’Haïti fasse partie de la GFA”.

Un “partenariat” réussi dans le cadre de l’ACM entre Haïti et Washington garantirait qu’Haïti reste sous l’hégémonie américaine pendant des décennies. Cela bloquerait également la diplomatie et les investissements de pays comme la Chine qui ont, pas plus tard qu’en 2017, proposé un projet d’infrastructure de 4,7 milliards de dollars.

Washington cherche désespérément à empêcher les soi-disant «États fragiles» comme Haïti de développer des relations diplomatiques avec la Chine et la Russie et de se joindre potentiellement à des projets d’investissement comme l’Initiative chinoise de la ceinture et de la route, ou BRICS.

Jovenel Moïse, assassiné il y a deux ans, a appris cette leçon à ses dépens. Embourbé dans la corruption et de plus en plus isolé des oligarques d’Haïti, Moïse a établi des relations diplomatiques officielles avec Moscou un mois seulement avant son assassinat, accréditant l’ambassadeur russe Sergey Melik-Bagdasarov. C’était la première fois qu’Haïti établissait des relations diplomatiques avec la Russie. Beaucoup ont fait valoir que cela aurait pu être un facteur qui a conduit Washington à donner son feu vert à l’assassinat de Moïse.

En effet, Washington a de bonnes raisons de craindre qu’Haïti noue des relations diplomatiques avec la Russie. Il était courant de voir des Haïtiens arborer des drapeaux russes lors de manifestations de rue au cours de l’année écoulée. L’économiste haïtien Boaz Anglade explique que les Haïtiens voient que “Poutine a défié l’Occident par l’invasion de l’Ukraine et sent l’avènement d’un nouvel ordre mondial où aucun pays ne prendra les rênes”. En d’autres termes, un monde multipolaire peut jouer en faveur des Haïtiens. Selon Anglade, “les Haïtiens ont prêté attention aux événements mondiaux et envoient un signal clair aux États-Unis”.

Cette dynamique parle directement de la division de classe en Haïti. Alors que des secteurs de la bourgeoisie haïtienne se disputent l’approbation, le soutien et le financement de Washington, le prolétariat lumpen haïtien et la paysannerie veulent se débarrasser de la domination hégémonique américaine. Les Haïtiens voient les avantages économiques et sociaux des investissements et des accords commerciaux avec des pays comme la Russie, la Chine et les BRICS en général.

En effet, dans un récent sondage auprès d’Haïtiens, lorsqu’on leur a demandé qui ils préféreraient pour mener une intervention en Haïti, 44% des 2610 réponses ont préféré la Russie, contre 19% pour les États-Unis. La préférence du Canada était passée de 23 % à 12 %.

C’est pourquoi Washington et le CORE groupe conspirent pour maintenir Haïti sous le contrôle hégémonique des États-Unis.

Autorisation de fabrication pour le Global Fragility Act

Washington a obtenu son consentement par le biais de divers groupes soutenus par le National Endowment For Democracy (NED), l’USAID et l’Open Society Foundation pour soutenir le GFA. Des organisations financées par la NED telles que l’Initiative de la Société Civile et l’OCAPH ont approuvé la GFA.

Moise Jean-Charles de Pitit Desalin et le président du PHTK, Liné Balthazar

Nou Pap Domi est une organisation membre fondatrice de l’Accord de Montana. L’un de ses principaux membres et porte-parole, Emmanuela Douyon, a récemment offert son soutien à la GFA lors d’une conférence de l’Alliance pour la consolidation de la paix le 15 décembre 2022.

Douyon travaillait auparavant pour le National Democratic Institute (NDI), une branche du NED, qui à son tour est financée par le Département d’État américain et l’USAID. Plus tard, elle a reçu une bourse NED pour fonder Policité, un « groupe de réflexion » qui mène des sondages et offre des services de consultation.

Jeffsky Poincy, un autre analyste qui a pris la parole lors de la conférence, a déclaré qu’il était “heureux qu’Haïti fasse partie de la GFA”. Poincy est gestionnaire de programme chez Partners Global, une société de conseil financée par le département d’État américain, le gouvernement canadien, l’Open Society Foundation et l’USAID.

Naed Jasmin Desiré est un autre exemple de dirigeant d’une organisation financée par les États-Unis qui soutient la politique étrangère américaine en Haïti. Desiré a cofondé Kafou Lespwa (KL) avec l’investisseur haïtien multimillionnaire Charles Clermont. Selon un rapport de l’USAID, Kafou Lespwa a utilisé des fonds de l’USAID pour se lancer KL, qui dépend du financement de la NED pour ses opérations annuelles. Kafou Lespwa rassemble des secteurs disparates de la classe politique haïtienne pour construire un consensus sur la manière de « sortir de la crise actuelle ».

Parmi les élites haïtiennes, les politiciens et les dirigeants de «l’équipe» Kafou Lespwa figurent: Clifford Apaid, le fils de l’oligarque Andy Apaid qui dirigeait l’organisation du Groupe des 184; Abdonel Doudou, boursier NED et responsable de Jurimedia en Haïti ; Edgar Leblanc Fils, coordonnateur général de l’OPL; Fritz Alphonse Jean, le président par intérim proposé par l’Accord de Montana ; Joel « Pasha » Vorbe, qui siège au conseil exécutif de Fanmi Lavalas ; Liné Balthazar, président du PHTK ; Pascales Solanges de Nou Pap Domi, et Paul Altidor, l’ancien ambassadeur d’Haïti aux États-Unis.

Avocat de formation, Desiré a également été impliqué très tôt dans la coalition à l’origine de l’Accord de Montana, avant de devenir membre de la BSA, dirigée par Magalie Comeau Denis et Ted Saint Dic. Désiré est finalement devenu le secrétaire du Conseil National de Transition  (CNT).

Bien que le point de vue de Desiré sur le GFA soit inconnu, son co-fondateur de KL, Charles Claremont, a approuvé le GFA lorsqu’il a pris la parole lors d’une conférence de NED en juillet 2022.

Les dirigeants du Montana n’ont pas encore approuvé publiquement la GFA. Leur modus operandi – rechercher le soutien et l’approbation de Washington tout en évitant d’établir des relations diplomatiques avec d’autres gouvernements, des organisations régionales ou des organisations internationales – suggère qu’ils annonceront éventuellement ce soutien, probablement lorsque le Montana prendra le relais ou sera intégré à un gouvernement de transition.

Naed Jasmin Desiré

Un parti politique haïtien se prononce contre le Global Fragility Act

Pendant ce temps, les partis politiques à l’intérieur d’Haïti tirent la sonnette d’alarme sur la GFA. Le coordinateur général de l’OPL, Edgar LeBlanc Fils, un des favoris de l’Accord du Montana pour le poste de président par intérim, craint que le Premier ministre de facto Ariel Henry ne tente de négocier une «aide à la sécurité» des États-Unis dans le cadre de l’ACM.

L’OPL est l’un des nombreux partis politiques qui ont initialement soutenu l’Accord du Montana. Qu’ils maintiennent ou non ce soutien n’est pas clair. La BPO est signataire de l’Accord. Mais récemment, le parti a signé une déclaration avec sept autres partis politiques, dont UNIR, LAPEH, GREH, PHTK, MOPOD et Platfòm Pitit Desalin. La plupart des partis sont répertoriés comme membres du CNT de Montana, y compris le PHTK. Leur désir de publier une déclaration le 30 janvier 2023, distincte de Montana, suggère un soutien décroissant.

La déclaration précise que les signataires « renouvellent leur engagement à privilégier les intérêts supérieurs du pays au détriment des intérêts personnels ou particuliers et des ambitions liées à la conquête et à l’exercice du pouvoir ». Si l’opposition à l’accord du 21 décembre d’Henry est affirmée directement par les signataires, le soutien au Montana est absent de la déclaration.

Le président du PHTK, Liné Balthazar, a en fait pris ses distances avec Henry il y a des mois. On ne sait pas s’il s’agit simplement de manœuvres politiques ou d’une opposition authentique au règne de facto d’Henri. La déclaration conjointe du PHTK avec des partis politiques de centre-gauche comme Pitit Desalin et le MOPOD est remarquable.

Une lettre ouverte du 24 avril 2023 au président du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies signée par plusieurs partis politiques et organisations de la société civile a également dénoncé la menace de la GFA. Parmi les signataires figurent les dirigeants Oxygène David du MOLEGHAF et Jean Hénold Buteau d’Alternative Socialiste. Se référant à la GFA, la lettre demandait au président du Conseil de sécurité, le Russe Vasily Nebenzya (le poste de président du Conseil de sécurité tourne mensuellement entre 15 pays membres), si la politique des États-Unis consistant à “imposer un plan décennal” à Haïti, qui est une “violation du droit à l’autodétermination du peuple haïtien” devait être soulevée.

Les partis politiques ont remanié leurs alliances à plusieurs reprises depuis que Jovenel Moïse a refusé de se retirer à la fin de son mandat le 7 février 2021. Leur insuccès est dû en partie à l’incapacité de la classe politique à construire une solidarité avec la population et à mobiliser les Haïtiens.

Les Haïtiens ne veulent clairement pas attendre que la classe politique les défende contre la violence endémique et dépravée des gangs criminels armés et des politiciens et oligarques qui les soutiennent. Depuis la fin avril, des dizaines de milliers d’Haïtiens se sont regroupés en un mouvement national sans chef appelé le “Bwa Kale” qui a poursuivi, confronté, appréhendé et tué plus de 100 membres de gangs criminels.

 

 

Une version antérieure de cet article a été publiée pour la première fois par The Canada Files. Travis Ross est un enseignant basé à Montréal, Québec. Il est également co-rédacteur en chef du projet d’information Canada-Haïti sur canada-haiti.ca. Travis a écrit pour Haïti Liberté, Black Agenda Report, TruthOut et rabble.ca. Il est joignable sur Twitter.

L’impérialisme canadien en Haïti

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Le Premier ministre canadien Justin Trudeau et le président américain Joe Biden en mars 2022.

Diriger une intervention pour restaurer la classe dirigeante d’Haïti. Ceci est la première partie d’une série sur l’impérialisme canadien en Haïti, contre la lutte des organisations populaires haïtiennes pour se libérer de l’occupation occidentale.

 

Le 2 avril, un groupe de solidarité haïtien nommé « Debout pour la dignité » a manifesté devant le bureau du premier ministre Trudeau à Montréal.

Leur principale demande est que le Canada intervienne en Haïti. Le président de l’organisation, Wilner Cayo, s’est adressé aux 200 manifestants – tous membres de la diaspora haïtienne. Selon un reportage du Journal de Montréal, il a dit aux manifestants qu’ils veulent un « engagement sérieux » du gouvernement canadien » et que « le Canada peut faire la différence ».

Joseph Flaubert Duclair, membre de Debout pour la Dignité, a déclaré à un journaliste du Journal de Montréal « nous ne voulons pas une invasion militaire, mais une force opérationnelle qui intervient au coup par coup ». Duclair croit que « le Canada doit faire cela, nous ne faisons pas confiance aux autres pays ».

L’approbation par Debout pour la Dignité d’une intervention dirigée par le Canada en Haïti ne reflète pas nécessairement les opinions d’une majorité de la diaspora haïtienne du Canada. Il y a seulement sept mois, plusieurs dirigeants de la communauté ont dit à Marisela Matador du Toronto Star qu’ils étaient contre une intervention. Chantal Ismé, vice-présidente de l’organisation communautaire Maison d’Haïti et membre de la Coalition haïtienne au Canada contre la dictature en Haïti, a déclaré que la plupart de la communauté haïtienne de Montréal s’oppose à une intervention militaire étrangère. Jean Ernest Pierre, propriétaire et animateur de CPAM 1410 – une station de radio de langue française desservant principalement la communauté haïtienne de Montréal, a fait écho à l’opposition d’Ismé en disant que “l’intervention et l’occupation militaires étrangères n’ont jamais aidé Haïti et n’ont fait que causer plus de mal”.

Reflétant le débat qui se déroule au niveau international, la diaspora haïtienne a des opinions variées sur la question de savoir si une intervention étrangère en Haïti contribuerait à aggraver la crise là-bas.

Comprendre le cadre d’une intervention et d’une occupation d’Haïti

Suite à l’assassinat du président Jovenel Moïse le 7 juillet 2021, le Premier ministre par intérim Claude Joseph a pris le pouvoir. Le successeur de Joseph, Ariel Henry, avait déjà été nommé par Moïse, mais n’avait pas encore prêté serment au moment de l’assassinat. Washington et le CORE groupe, dont le Canada est membre, ont décidé que le Dr Ariel Henry devrait être le chef du gouvernement et l’ont installé comme Premier ministre de facto d’Haïti par un tweet le 17 juillet 2021 lié à une courte déclaration du CORE Group, qui a été consciencieusement affiché par le BINUH, le Bureau des Nations Unies en Haïti.

Cette décision a démontré le statut actuel d’Haïti en tant que néo-colonie, dirigée par le gouvernement américain et ses alliés du CORE groupe. La nomination d’Henry par les puissances néocoloniales était en soi une intervention. C’était aussi une action de maintien pour permettre à Washington et au CORE groupe d’organiser un cadre d’intervention, tout en aggravant la crise d’insécurité et de pauvreté à l’intérieur d’Haïti par le biais de la corruption et des tactiques dilatoires d’Henry. Henry, qui n’a pas de mandat populaire, a demandé cette intervention le 9 octobre 2022. Cette demande a été soutenue par le secrétaire général de l’ONU, Antonio Guterres.

Le cadre proposé par Guterres dans une lettre du 8 octobre 2022 au Conseil de sécurité propose deux options. La première, une “force militaire spéciale” dont le but serait de rétablir l’ordre dans la capitale haïtienne, Port-au-Prince. Deuxièmement, « l’appui à la Police nationale d’Haïti (PNH) » sous la forme de « conseillers », d’équipements, de formation, d’armes et de munitions.

La ministre canadienne des Affaires étrangères Mélanie Joly à Ottawa en mars 2022.
Photo: Adrien Wyld

Les efforts pour simplement envahir et occuper Haïti ont été bloqués au Conseil de sécurité par la Russie et la Chine. Cela faisait suite aux efforts concertés de l’Alliance noire pour la paix et d’Haïti Liberté pour faire pression sur les gouvernements des deux pays afin de bloquer les efforts des États-Unis et de l’ONU pour envoyer une «force militaire spéciale». Ces deux organisations ont effectivement relayé ce que le peuple haïtien a clairement exprimé à maintes reprises : Non à une autre intervention militaire étrangère !

La ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada, Mélanie Joly, l’a confirmé dans un commentaire fait lors d’une entrevue avec Daniel Thibeault de RDI sur “Les Coulisses du Pouvoir”. Joly a déploré que “le problème avec l’ONU en ce moment est que le Conseil de sécurité est paralysé parce que la Chine et en particulier la Russie bloquent toute forme de travail qui peut être effectué via le Conseil”. Cela a mis en évidence le soutien diplomatique du Canada à la demande d’intervention du chef de facto, malgré le manque de soutien d’Henry et un mandat populaire.

Dans une lettre du 8 octobre 2022 au Conseil de sécurité, Guterres explique que « la Police nationale haïtienne est dispersée ». Selon Guterres, “quelque 13 000 agents seraient affectés à des activités de maintien de l’ordre” en Haïti. Il est important de noter que « seul un tiers serait opérationnel et assumerait des fonctions de sécurité publique à un moment donné ».

Le nombre d’agents de la PNH serait tombé entre 9 000 et 10 000. L’ONU calcule qu’Haïti a un ratio de policiers par rapport à la population de 1,06 policiers pour 1 000 habitants. C’est près de la moitié du ratio international suggéré par l’ONU de 2,2 pour 1 000.

Il est entendu qu’un nombre important d’officiers sont redevables à des gangs criminels, travaillent comme sécurité personnelle pour des politiciens corrompus ou collaborent avec des brigades de vigilance en dehors de la structure de commandement de la PNH.

Décrivant par inadvertance les risques d’un «soutien impérialiste à la PNH» dans le Washington Post du 2 décembre 2022, l’ancien ambassadeur des États-Unis en Haïti a appelé l’administration Biden à envoyer «2 000 forces de l’ordre armées» en Haïti. Pour éviter l’optique de milliers de forces de l’ordre américaines armées débarquant en Haïti, elle propose que les États-Unis “en envoient quelques centaines à la fois, pendant six mois, avec peu de fanfare”.

Si le « soutien à la PNH » devient un flux lent mais régulier d’officiers et de militaires étrangers en Haïti, les officiers étrangers pourraient facilement égaler ou dépasser en nombre le personnel actuel de la PNH, conduisant à une occupation étrangère sous un nom différent. Ce «soutien» peut être qualifié de dirigé par les Haïtiens, car une poignée d’agents de la PNH auraient sûrement un rôle symbolique dans les opérations de police «anti-gang».

La réalité est qu’une “force internationale” de 3 000 à 5 000 hommes conduirait certainement des officiers étrangers à avoir un effet significatif et direct sur la vie quotidienne en Haïti. Le « soutien à la PNH » est simplement une intervention militaire étrangère sous un autre nom.

Le ministre Joly a confirmé avec désinvolture comment un prétendu soutien à la police haïtienne peut fonctionner comme un double langage politique pour l’occupation et l’oppression. “Le Canada est toujours un chef de file sur la question d’Haïti”, a-t-elle déclaré, ayant “contribué à la formation des policiers pendant des années”. Joly ignore ou oublie que la formation policière à laquelle elle fait référence impliquait que la GRC ait été amenée en Haïti pour former des agents de la PNH immédiatement après le coup d’État de 2004 contre le président démocratiquement élu Jean Bertrand Aristide. Aristide a remporté plus de 90 % du vote populaire lors des élections de 2000, tandis que des milliers de candidats Fanmi Lavalas (FL) ont également été élus à divers postes gouvernementaux. La plupart d’entre eux ont également été renversés lors du coup d’État.

Une enquête menée par les auteurs Nik Barry-Shaw et Dru Oja Jay a révélé que la GRC « a fourni une formation et un contrôle à la nouvelle Police nationale d’Haïti, qui a ramené de nombreux membres de l’armée nationale redoutée qui avait été dissoute par Aristide ». Cela fait suite au rôle actif du Canada dans le coup d’État qui «a plongé Haïti dans la violence et le chaos dont il ne s’est pas encore remis».

Leur enquête montre que la police haïtienne formée par la GRC était «souvent accompagnée de soldats américains et canadiens et plus tard des forces des Nations Unies» alors qu’elle «se lançait dans une série d’incursions dans les quartiers les plus pauvres de Port-au-Prince». La PNH « a tué des civils innocents, emprisonné des dissidents politiques sans inculpation et poussé les principaux partisans d’Aristide à se cacher ou à s’exiler ».

Lorsqu’il est devenu clair pour Washington et le CORE Group fin 2022 que toute tentative d’intervention militaire serait rejetée par le peuple haïtien et bloquée au Conseil de sécurité, la deuxième option de Guterres pour intervenir en Haïti a été acceptée : « Soutenir la PNH » par la vente d’armes, d’équipements militaires, de véhicules militaires, de formations et de « conseillers » militaires et policiers. Comme l’a expliqué Joly, « la situation en Haïti s’est aggravée et justifie l’approche du Canada de renforcer la Police nationale d’Haïti ».

En d’autres termes, le soutien du CORE groupe au Premier ministre Ariel Henry a fait croître l’insécurité et la violence des gangs armés à un tel degré qu’une intervention étrangère sous une forme ou une autre semble inévitable.

Qui dirigera l’occupation d’Haïti ?

Washington et le CORE groupe ont eu du mal à trouver un leader national prêt à mener une intervention en Haïti, seule une poignée de pays des Caraïbes et d’Afrique proposant de fournir du personnel ou des soldats pour soutenir la PNH.

Les efforts de l’ONU et de Washington pour trouver une nation prête à mener une intervention armée ont jusqu’à présent échoué. Même le Premier ministre canadien Justin Trudeau a, jusqu’à présent, refusé le rôle. Au lieu de cela, il a essayé de trouver un dirigeant de la CARICOM pour le faire lors du récent sommet semestriel des dirigeants de l’organisation. Il s’est fait grignoter par une poignée de dirigeants caribéens, dont le Premier ministre jamaïcain Andrew Holness.

Tout en étant disposé à s’impliquer dans les négociations avec Ariel Henry et divers groupes politiques et de la société civile rivaux, Holness n’a pas pu rassembler suffisamment de personnel et d’expertise pour mener l’intervention.

Quelques semaines plus tard, le président américain Joe Biden effectuait sa première visite au Canada. En tête de l’ordre du jour, Haïti. Trudeau a de nouveau évité l’appel à mener une intervention en Haïti. Après avoir dit aux médias que « le Canada est prêt à aider », Trudeau a promis 100 millions de dollars supplémentaires pour la PNH et a déployé deux navires de guerre de classe Kingston pour « faire de la reconnaissance » le long de la côte d’Haïti. Cela a suivi le Canada qui a fait voler un avion espion militaire au-dessus d’Haïti, soi-disant pour faire de la reconnaissance sur les activités des gangs. De plus, le Canada a organisé la vente de certains véhicules blindés à la PNH, et d’autres sont en cours. L’ambassadeur du Canada en Haïti, Sébastien Carrière, a résumé les mouvements comme « un important déploiement militaire ».

La livraison initiale de véhicules blindés a contribué à briser le blocus du terminal pétrolier de Varreaux en novembre 2022.

Les chefs militaires canadiens ont clairement indiqué qu’ils n’avaient pas les ressources nécessaires pour mener une mission en Haïti, ce qui rend ce scénario peu probable.

De plus, le calendrier proposé pour une intervention en Haïti est irréaliste, le général canadien à la retraite Tom Lawson faisant cette évaluation sans ambages à Matt Galloway sur l’émission The Current de CBC Radio : un crochet à tout pays qui pourrait diriger ou contribuer à une force là-bas. On ne parle pas de six mois. Nous ne parlons pas de quelques années. Nous parlons probablement de cinq à 10, 15 ans parce que nous parlons d’édification de la nation. Il ne s’agit pas d’établir une zone sûre et sécurisée pour que le gouvernement puisse maintenant s’acquitter de ses tâches. Nous parlons d’un gouvernement qui ne fonctionne pas… Et c’est en termes de décennies, comme nous l’avons vu en Afghanistan et en Irak.

Les observations de Lawson soulignent comment le «soutien» à la PNH ne fait que couvrir ce qui allait devenir une autre occupation étrangère d’Haïti.

Diriger une force d’occupation en Haïti pendant une décennie ou plus, avec une population hostile aux troupes étrangères, contre des gangs intégrés à la géographie et aux populations de Port-au-Prince, est probablement désagréable pour Trudeau, qui doit être conscient de cette évaluation .

Trudeau a sans aucun doute été informé de la force d’occupation de l’ONU de 2004 à 2017, la MINUSTAH. Son mandat initial était de six mois mais a été prolongé de plus de 12 ans.

Le Premier ministre Trudeau a créé avec enthousiasme une liste de politiciens haïtiens sanctionnés, de soi-disant chefs de gangs et de «chefs d’entreprise». Ce régime de sanctions a été entièrement performatif. Les quelques Haïtiens sanctionnés qui ont de l’argent ou des biens au Canada n’ont pas encore vu ces sanctions appliquées. Plus important encore, la grande majorité des dirigeants et politiciens haïtiens ciblés ont leur argent et leurs investissements aux États-Unis.

Avant l’annonce de l’accord du 21 décembre d’Henry l’année dernière, il semblait que ces sanctions étaient conçues pour aligner la classe politique et le secteur des affaires haïtiens fracturés sur les diktats de Washington. Ces sanctions n’ont pas menacé le pouvoir d’Henry. Lors de sa visite à la réunion semestrielle des dirigeants de la CARICOM, il a expliqué à VOA Kreyol que les sanctions lui avaient été “utiles”.

 

 

  • Une version antérieure de cet article a été publiée pour la première fois par The Canada Files. Travis Ross est un enseignant basé à Montréal, Québec. Il est également co-rédacteur en chef du projet d’information Canada-Haïti sur canada-haiti.ca. Travis a écrit pour Haïti Liberté, Black Agenda Report, TruthOut et rabble.ca. Il est joignable sur Twitter.

 

Canadian Imperialism in Haiti (3)

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Three men carry a suspected bandit. The Bwa Kale movement is pursuing suspected criminal gang members in Port-au-Prince and around Haiti.

This is the last of a three-part series by The Canada Files on Canadian imperialism in Haiti versus the fight of the Haitian grassroots to free themselves from Western occupation.

(Part 1) (Part 2)

 Bwa Kale is a spontaneous, leaderless anti-gang uprising.

According to journalist Dan Cohen: “The term ‘Bwa Kale’ literally means ‘peeled wood.’ It refers to the tool used in a severe form of corporal punishment in some Haitian homes and reflects not only the will of its participants to identify, catch, and kill the violent criminals who have long terrorized the country with kidnapping, extortion, and murder, but also to employ the criminal gang’s same gruesome methods of violence against the population.”

Bwa Kale has also been successful. According to reports, kidnappings in Haiti have dropped to zero since the movement began 10 weeks ago in late April. According to a recent report by human rights group the Centre d’analyse et de recherche en droits de l’homme (CARDH), Bwa Kale has “resulted in no kidnappings taking place from Apr. 24 to May 24.” CARDH’s report goes on to point out that “the ‘Bwa Kale’ movement has in just one month produced convincing, visible results; fear has changed sides. Both kidnappings and gang-related killings have fallen drastically.”

Miragoâne commissaire Jean Ernest Muscadin, encourages citizens to arm themselves with machetes to take on gangs and has carried out summary executions of suspected gang members.

While Bwa Kale is a leaderless movement, some local leaders have emerged to encourage and arm the population to form vigilance brigades and fight the gangs, often in coordination with local police officers. Videos shared on social media show machetes being produced and distributed.

Jean Ernest Muscadin, a government commissioner in the Miragoâne commune on Haiti’s southern peninsula, is one example. Muscadin encourages citizens to arm themselves with machetes and take on gangs. He has also carried out summary executions of suspected gang members.

Other social or community leaders have begun to emerge as well. A recent Al Jazeera report identified two social leaders, Jean Baptist Kenley of the Solino neighborhood and another leader introduced as “Emanuel” from Bel Air. Both encouraged the people to join the Bwa Kale movement.

Inside Port au Prince, Jimmy Cherizier, the former cop and spokesperson for the Revolutionary Forces of the G9 Family and Allies (FRG9), leads an alliance of anti-gang armed vigilance brigades. While leaders like Muscadin have no particular political message, Cherizier has called for the overthrow of Haiti’s bourgeoisie and what he calls their “stinking, rotten system.” Instead of “5% controlling 85% of the nation’s wealth,” he calls for a system where Haiti’s resources are shared by all. Described as “Aristide with a gun”, Cherizier’s demands focus on potable water, food, employment, infrastructure, hospitals, clinics, and education.

Cherizier was targeted by the RNDDH, FJKL, and other Washington-backed organizations in a smear campaign linking him to alleged massacres. These accusations have been thoroughly debunked in the online documentary series Another Vision, available on Haïti Liberté’s YouTube channel.

The case of Cherizier shows the risk to potential leaders who will likely emerge from the Bwa Kale movement. They might also be targeted by Washington-backed NGOs or “human rights groups” which disapprove of their tactics or their political ideologies.

The mainstream media (MSM) in the West is happy to consume and regurgitate simple narratives presented by human rights groups like the RNDDH, never subjecting their claims to proper scrutiny. MSM journalists have so far proven unwilling to do the research that indicates that “human rights leaders” like Pierre Espérance and Marie Yolène Gilles are not trustworthy sources.

As veteran Haitian journalist André Charlier noted, the “RNDDH is a political organization hiding behind the facade of a human rights organization.” That facade is maintained through funding from Washington.

Gilles is an ex-employee of the RNDDH who left to form her own human rights group, the Fondasyon Je Klere (The Open Eyes Foundation or FJKL), which also partners with the U.S. government. FJKL is co-founded by Samuel Madistin, a politician turned human rights advocate, who ran for President during the 2016 election. Madistin is also a lawyer and represents Réginald Boulos, a Haitian oligarch. Boulos funded the Group of 184, a “civil society” coalition which led the 2004 coup against Aristide. These organizations actively disseminate misinformation for their own political ends or to serve North American interests.

Other websites such as Insight Crime and AyiboPost repeat disproved allegations leveled against Cherizier. Predictably, Insight Crime is funded by the Soros’ Open Society Foundation and the U.S. State Department, while Ayibopost takes money from the NED.

It is not uncommon to see uniformed police officers cooperating with Bwa Kale activists. As Louis-Henri Mars remarked in an interview with the CBC “the police, the street officers at least, have suffered quite a bit at the hands of the gangs who’ve been killing them, and hiding and destroying the bodies of those they kill so that their families would not be able to give them proper burial. So the street officers are also in a lot of ways taking things into their own hands.”

Former cop Jimmy Cherizier leads the Revolutionary Forces of the G9 Family and Allies (FRG9), an alliance of anti-gang armed vigilance brigades. He calls for the overthrow of Haiti’s bourgeoisie.

Cherizier has the support of many Haitian police officers. When Cherizier was dismissed from the PNH in 2018 after he and other cops were blamed for civilian deaths during a Nov. 17, 2017 police raid in Grand Ravine, he partnered with other disaffected officers to rid their neighborhoods of armed gangs. It is unsurprising that cops organize themselves to fight against local criminal gangs, since PNH leadership have done such a poor job of eradicating them. The similarities to Bwa Kale are obvious – Cherizier, working with other police officers independently of the PNH’s command structure, organized with their fellow citizens to rid their neighborhoods of armed criminal gangs.

Cherizier recently expressed his full support for the Bwa Kale movement in an interview with Haiti Liberté. The G9’s leadership had previously been hesitant to do so because it feared the Bwa Kale would be targeted by Washington-backed groups like the RNDDH.

Cherizier explained that: “Many journalists are trying to make people believe that the G9 movement is behind [the Bwa Kale] and that it is a bandit-to-bandit movement, just so they can discredit the people’s fight. That is one of the reasons why we in the G9 hadn’t taken a public position to support Bwa Kale, because we know the system is so strong and powerful. Once we take a public position to say we support Bwa Kale, we feared they would use this to make politics with it. But we of the G9 Family and Allies, we fully support the Bwa Kale movement that the people have launched, because it brings many results. Since the Bwa Kale started, there have been zero kidnappings for two weeks, that is thanks to the people’s movement. So we in the G9 encourage the people not to let go of their Bwa Kale, not to stop, for the people to continue to maintain the movement.”

Indeed, the RNDDH’s Rosy Ducema has described Bwa Kale as a “spiral of violence.” Ducema encourages Bwa Kale activists to hand over gang members to the police, while acknowledging that “the rare times the armed bandits have been arrested government commissioners, their surrogates, and judges accept bribes to free them.” In a separate interview, Espérance offered the same advice to the population.

“RNDDH is a political organization hiding behind the facade of a human rights organization.”

These interviews followed a May 9, 2023, RNDDH report that stated unequivocally that Bwa Kale “cannot overcome” the gangs and that “state authorities must immediately take the necessary measures to put an end to all forms of violence,” including adopting “immediate measures to put an end to the ongoing spiral of violence” in Haiti.

Espérance seems to be concerned primarily with stopping a popular movement in its tracks. He demands that Bwa Kale activists hand over their movement to “state authorities.” One must wonder how Espérance differentiates between the state authorities who actively finance or tacitly support gangs and those who do not?

Espérance and RNDDH have a record that shows they have no problem with state violence directed at popular movements. What they do take issue with is popular movements threatening the political class, to which Espérance and his confederates belong.

It was no surprise then, that Espérance recently smeared Muscadin as being a “member of the G9 who works for the PHTK,” offering no evidence to support his claims. He is more concerned with stamping out any potential new leadership emerging from popular movements, as they potentially threaten the legitimacy of the bourgeois leadership that has been nurtured and supported by Washington.

Instead, Espérance appeals to his principal funder – the U.S. government – to “withdraw their political and financial support” for Ariel Henry and those who support him once the Montana Accord is “operationalized.” In an article for Just Security, Espérance explained that the “United States and others in the international community must press harder” to bring about a “responsible transition back to democracy and sustainable security for Haiti.”

Like Saint Dic, Espérance doesn’t see the Haitian people as worthy of appealing to for support or legitimacy. The focus of the elites who back the Montana Accord is to leverage U.S. hegemony to dislodge the PHTK and reconstitute Haiti’s fractured bourgeoisie.

Can Montana change course?

The fact that many in the Haitian diaspora are only now being introduced to the Montana Accord coalition speaks to the poverty of reporting on Haiti generally in the west. It also reflects the fact that Montana’s leadership wasted months appealing to Washington in place of building solidarity in Haiti and in the diaspora as insecurity grew exponentially inside Haiti.

Could a change in leadership make a difference? Jean Hénold Buteau, one of Montana’s candidates for interim Prime Minister, inspires some in the diaspora. He is the leader of l’Alternative Socialiste (Socialist Alternative). His influence inside the Montana coalition seems insignificant, however, as the leadership’s persistent appeal to Washington for legitimacy has remained uninterrupted for almost two years. Moreover, his signature on the aforementioned open letter suggests l’Alternative Socialiste is looking outside the Montana coalition to find a solution to the crisis.

Would a return from Fanmi Lavalas (FL) to the Montana coalition help them reverse course and rebuild the broad-base? This seems unlikely. While FL was hugely influential in the past, its popularity in Haiti currently is greatly diminished as compared to the period of 1990 – 2016.

FL’s base has fractured over past years. First, the Struggling People’s Organization (OPL), formerly the Lavalas Political Organization, disassociated itself from Aristide in 1997 due to political differences. Next, René Préval disassociated from it to form Lespwa. Fanmi Lavalas continued to lose higher profile leaders such as Moïse Jean-Charles, who split from FL to form his own party, Platfòm Pitit Desalin (Dessalines’ Children Platform) and Jean Henry Céant who founded the Renmen Ayiti (Love Haiti) political party.

While Jean-Bertrand Aristide remains a very popular and cherished leader, he has made it quite clear he will not return to politics. FL’s current executive committee is a shadow of its former glory, made up of bourgeois like Maryse Narcisse, who have proven unable to build a larger base of supporters inside Haiti.

Furthermore, two ex-deputies who continue to represent FL, Roger Millien and Printemps Bélizaire, have been accused of working with armed criminal gangs. Millien admitted to knowing a gang leader and driving gang members to a hospital after a shooting. Bélizaire is a suspect in the 2018 murder of journalist Vladimir Legagneur and was recorded stating in public that he “burn[ed] down police stations and murder[s] people with machetes.”

FL’s impotence as a political force was furthered when its executive committee withdrew their delegates from Montana’s CNT. Since then, they have not formed any coalitions or proposed any strategies that have garnered popular support. FL regularly produces statements that are dutifully translated and disseminated by party stalwarts in Western countries. These statements, however, are vague and cliched.

Former Lavalas deputy Printemps Bélizaire is a suspect in the 2018 murder of journalist Vladimir Legagneur and was recorded stating that he “burn[ed] down police stations and murder[s] people.”
For example, a recent FL statement, translated into English by the Haiti Action Committee and dated Mar. 23, 2023, states the following: “To produce sustainable results, any viable transition project must be decided collectively and carried out by a credible team trusted by the public. In this transition there needs to be the active participation of human resources from the diaspora, alongside local resources, so that together we can develop a project for society for the next 25 years by Haitians for Haiti.”

FL is also onboard with the strategy of tackling the security crisis by “strengthening the PNH,” insisting this must be a “Haitian initiative.”

Fanmi Lavalas’ executive committee seems to understand their diminished popular support. Last summer, six months after withdrawing from Montana’s CNT, they organized a press conference to encourage the population to get behind the proposal that Aristide should lead a two-year transitional government, apparently suggesting that Aristide dislodge Montana’s “elected” interim President.

This sparked demonstrations in favor of Aristide’s return, highlighting the sharp difference between Aristide’s personal popularity and that of his party’s executive committee. FL stalwarts in the United-States also celebrated Aristide’s seemingly imminent return, dubbing it “the second coming of Aristide.”

The most bewildering aspect of this failed attempt to get Aristide back into politics was explained by journalist Isabelle Papillon. The campaign “began immediately after the Jun. 8 visit to Aristide’s home in Tabarre by long-time U.S. State Department official Helen La Lime,” a despised figure in Haiti. Until recently, she headed the BINUH (United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti). Papillon notes that, had this campaign been successful, it would have undermined Aristide’s credibility as his ascendency to the position of interim President could easily have been interpreted as a nomination by Washington and the CORE group.

This illustrates what Patrick Elie, a pro-democracy activist who worked alongside Aristide, remarked on in a 2007 interview: “You could see how [Fanmi Lavalas] became totally in disarray after president Aristide was kidnapped. It was what I would describe as a charismatic organization, one that depends strictly on its leader and after that you have nothing in terms of structure and in terms of capacity to formulate a political strategy.”

Elie explained that “Lavalas is this movement, but Lavalas and Fanmi Lavalas, although related, are different things. Fanmi Lavalas is a political organization. Lavalas is a political philosophy, not a party.”

Haitian diaspora groups in Canada: Ransoms, exactions, and desperation

Some members of the Haitian diaspora are changing their opinion and endorsing some sort of foreign intervention in their homeland. Kidnappings in Haiti have a direct effect on family members living abroad. Speaking at a protest organized by Debout pour la dignité, Pastor Joseph Jr Clorméus of the Church of God of Prophecy said the ransom demands reach relatives abroad, who must organize fundraisers. He says his followers are being asked for US$420,000 for the release of seven people. He says this is” just the tip of the iceberg.”

Solidarité Québec-Haiti (SQH) activist Jean Saint-Vil described the effects of kidnappings and ransoms on family members in the diaspora almost two years ago in a presentation posted to Facebook. Haitians in the diaspora have been forced to mortgage or sell their homes, take out loans, and empty their bank account to pay the ransom demands.

“the traditional political class’ interest, civil society’s interest, is to take power without the conditions of the poorest masses ever changing.”

After years of extortion from abroad and watching their loved ones being terrorized by armed gangs, some Haitians in the diaspora feel like a foreign intervention is the only option. As Mr. Flaubert Duclair of Debout pour la Dignité explained, “we do not want a military invasion” but the “current horror leaves no other choice.”

This view is shared by others in the diaspora, and is being amplified by the MSM. In a recent guest essay for the New York Times, Dr. Jean W. Pape, a professor at New York’s Weill Cornell Medical College, wrote “Haitians cannot overcome this crisis … without foreign intervention.” Pape explained that, from his perspective, Haitians “do not see a solution to our crisis without foreign intervention. We need experienced international forces to support and train our national police force and provide security as we work toward rebuilding our government.”

The UN and CARICOM continue to conspire to prevent Bwa Kale from succeeding

Henry recently signed a “United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework Plan” with the UN. The UN says this “joint roadmap” is “designed to improve the coherence, effectiveness and efficiency of UN support to the Government.” The agreed upon “priority areas of work include governance, security and rule of law, inclusive economic transformation, social services, and the environment.”

Helen La Lime’s successor, Maria Isabel Salvador, commented on the plan, saying ominously that “the success of Haiti will depend on the success of BINUH’s effort to establish this cooperation framework.” In a recent briefing to the Security Council, Salvador said “we need to find innovative ways to define the force to support the Haitian National Police.” She cited Guterres’ October letter, endorsing an “urgent need for the deployment” of an “International Specialized Force.”

While propping up a dictator, the UN is working on multiple fronts to undermine Haitian sovereignty and impose a foreign intervention.

After meeting with Guterres, CARICOM announced that Haitian leaders were invited to a conference in Jamaica in mid-June. CARICOM also announced that an “Eminent Persons Group” (EPG) will be formed to lead negotiations. The CARICOM Secretariat named the EPG members as former Bahamas Prime Minister Perry Christie, former Jamaican Prime Minister Bruce Golding, and their St. Lucian counterpart, Dr. Kenny D. Anthony. The EPG is a sort of “Lima Group” knock-off.

The governments of the Bahamas and Jamaica support a military intervention in Haiti.

Whatever individuals from the Montana coalition or Henry’s HCT are selected for the impending transitional government, Washington and the CORE group will maintain control of Haiti. Montana’s leadership is a controlled opposition to Henry, who is in turn a U.S. government-backed puppet.

As Cherizier explained in an interview featured in Episode Three of Another Vision, “the traditional political class’ interest, civil society’s interest, is to take power without the conditions of the poorest masses ever changing…. [They] send their children to school overseas. They all have international health coverage, so when they get sick they get medical care abroad. Those people, both the traditional parties and civil society, embody apartheid.” Cherizier argues that “they aren’t patriots, they don’t love this country. They just see Haiti as their little store that makes them money for them to live with their family – with the political class and bourgeoisie that are just as stinking and corrupt as they are.”

Late pro-democracy activist Patrick Elie: “[The Lavalas Family] is what I would describe as a charismatic organization, one that depends strictly on its leader and after that you have nothing in terms of structure and in terms of capacity to formulate a political strategy.”
Violence perpetrated by oligarch-backed armed gangs, which function as paramilitary groups, have fractured the capital. The often-cited statistic that 80% of Port-au-Prince is controlled by gangs is misleading. A majority of Port-au-Prince is controlled by oligarch-backed gangs who often function as paramilitary groups. They oppose vigilance brigades and anti-crime groups like the FRG9 and, increasingly, the Bwa Kale movement.

These armed gangs destabilize Haiti and create the justification for a foreign intervention, which Henry requested to shore up his rule.

These armed gangs and paramilitary groups now extend well beyond Port-au-Prince into rural areas, threatening agriculture and local food supplies. Furthermore, insecurity and the threat of violence prevents what produce is grown from being transported. With more than a third of the population facing acute hunger, access to food is vital.

The crisis is escalating. Bwa Kale is a result, in part, of the political class’ inability to organize a credible transitional government and force Henry out of office. It is a response, not only to the daily acts of depraved violence committed by oligarch-backed armed gangs, but to the political void that has led to Henry’s uninterrupted reign as a U.S.-backed dictator.

This political leadership void has led to the rise of local leaders like Muscadin and Cherizier who defend their communities. Meanwhile, Montana’s proposed interim president Fritz Alphonse Jean admits to spending weeks barricaded in his home, insulated from the daily acts of violence perpetrated against Haitians.

Violence by armed criminal gangs is experienced very differently depending on one’s class in Haiti. The poor majority had no way to defend themselves before Bwa Kale. This is not the case for the small middle and upper classes. Wealthy Haitians have options beyond barricading their home, including hiring security companies, buying arsenals, and paying policemen to protect their neighborhoods.

International solidarity

Canadians seeking to show solidarity with Haitians have options. Haitian unions are mobilizing and are seeking international solidarity.

Labor unions met in Ouanaminthe in January with representatives from unions from all over the world. The gathering resulted in the “Ouanaminthe Declaration,” which called for “international solidarity generally, and trade union solidarity in particular.” It also rejects international military intervention, stating that “any international armed intervention would go against Haitians’ right to self-determination.”

Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) Regional Vice-President for Quebec, Richard Delisle, attended the meeting. Heeding the call for international solidarity between trade unions, Delisle said that “CUPE has written to Foreign Affairs minister Mélanie Joly calling on the Canadian government to respect Haitian democracy and self determination, and to stay away from military intervention.”

Another call to support labor unions recently came from Montreal-based Haiti solidarity group REHMONCO.

“The Haitian people, acting with full sovereignty, must be allowed to sort out their own problems.”

Canadians can also support Haiti by calling on their government to stop supporting de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry. They can also call him what he is – a Washington and CORE Group-backed dictator.

In a Jun. 12, 2023 statement calling for solidarity with Haiti, SQH called for an end to “foreign interference [that] has been and remains the main, persistent source of violent crimes linked to political disturbance in Haitian society.” According to the statement, SQH “cautiously welcomed the Montana accord but have also been critical of it.” It is unclear what these criticisms are. SQH emphasized that they “expect and encourage the signatories of the Montana accord to do more to connect with the struggling masses.” SQH also encourages allies to “listen and hear [the] genuine voices” of Haitians.

SQH’s support for Montana contrasts with that of many Haitian anti-imperialists such as MOLEGHAF, a popular organization which recently partnered with the Black Alliance for Peace (BAP). MOLEGHAF’s secretary general Oxygène David is very critical of Montana’s leadership, stating that they “did nothing more than plunge the masses deeper into exclusion, poverty, and misery.” (MOLEGHAF’s reasons for leaving Montana are explained in depth in Haïti Liberté). BAP’s Haiti/America’s Team Co-Coordinator Dr. Jemima Pierre has also denounced the Montana group as a “bourgeois opposition.”

Canadians should actively call out misinformation and propaganda disseminated by U.S.-funded groups like the RNDDH, FJKL, JURIMEDIA, and OCAPH. These groups operate with impunity and are treated as legitimate sources of information and opinion by the MSM and Western governments.

Canadians are not immune from U.S.-funded propaganda, as Peter Biesterfeld explained in his article about the Canadian mainstream media’s failure to inform the public on foreign policy. He argues that “Canadian news consumers who exclusively read, watch, and listen to mainstream news remain under-informed” about Canadian foreign policy.  “Canadian mainstream journalism around Haitian affairs,” Biesterfeld observes, “relies heavily on official narratives provided by Western government officials, human rights organizations, and think tanks.” When citing sources from these “human rights organizations”, Canadian mainstream media do not mention that they are funded by the NED or regime-change foundation like the Open Society Foundation.

Many Haitians understand the toxic effect of such groups on the discourse in Western countries, and the need for Haitians to speak for themselves through movements like Bwa Kale.

There are also organizations in the United States and Haiti which have demonstrated their ability to effectively lobby in a multipolar world and get results.

The Black Alliance for Peace (BAP) and Haiti Liberté effectively helped to block U.S. efforts at the UN to occupy Haiti under the guise of a “special military force.” BAP delivered an open letter to the Representatives of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation in October titled “No to Foreign Military Intervention In Haiti! Yes, to Haitian Self-Determination!”

Having alerted the Russian delegation about Washington’s aim to militarily intervene in Haiti, Haiti Liberté delivered an anti-intervention presentation to the UN Security Council.

These efforts resulted in Russia and China blocking Washington and the CORE groups efforts at the UN Security Council. Supporting efforts like these on the international front can have direct, tangible effects on efforts to intervene in Haiti.

Haiti’s current system of governance, in which, according to Louis-Henri Mars, “gangs bolster politics,” is self-perpetuating “because the Haitian state and society have done so little for so many neglected neighborhoods, and many young people are desperate.”

Canada’s sanctions regime, as well as PM Trudeau’s support for the PNH, has only strengthened Ariel Henry’s position, thereby increasing the suffering of Haitians.

Bwa Kale shows that Haitians are trying to break that cycle.

The FRG9’s defeated blockades at the Varreux Terminal underline the profound effect an international  force will have on Port-au-Prince and Haiti generally. In November 2022, only three armed vehicles and some PNH troops dislodged and pushed back a group that is routinely framed in the MSM as fearsome and powerful. The blockade was intended to pressure Henry to step down, one among many blockades around Port-au-Prince at the time. FRG9 spokesperson Jimmy Cherizier had called for Henry to resign, suggesting a transitional government of locally-elected community representatives take power. His efforts were thwarted by Canada and the UN.

This framework of supporting the PNH’s efforts to end gang violence also belies a crucial factor. Criminal gangs are a symptom, not the root cause of violence.  Louis-Henri Mars, the executive director of Lakou Lapè, a peacebuilding organization, argues that “every Haitian I know is aware that, over the past 20 years, government ministers and senators and parliamentary delegates have delivered money and weapons to gangs.”

Bwa Kale’s current target is armed criminal gangs. André Charlier writes that Haitians now “seem to burn with a furious desire to redo 1804,” referring to the Haitian revolution. Those in power who fund and arm gangs must wonder if, once the gangs are eliminated, are they next?

In December, journalist Kim Ives told the UN Security Council, “the situation in Haiti cannot be resolved through foreign intervention, military force, or even sanctions. The Haitian people, acting with full sovereignty, must be allowed to sort out their own problems.” Berthony Dupont, Haiti Liberté’s director, concurs: “ it is only through their own struggle that they will defeat all the maneuvers and interference of the imperialists and their local lackeys.”


An earlier version of this article was first published by The Canada Files. Travis Ross is a teacher based in Montreal, Québec. He is also the co-editor of the Canada-Haiti Information Project at canada-haiti.ca . Travis has written for Haiti Liberté, Black Agenda Report, TruthOut, and rabble.ca. He can be reached on Twitter.

Canadian Imperialism in Haiti (2)

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Jacques Ted Saint Dic and Magali Comeau-Denis of the Montana Accord with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian Nichols (center).

(Part 1)

This is part two of a three-part series by The Canada Files on Canadian imperialism in Haiti versus the fight of the Haitian grassroots to free themselves from Western occupation.

The “large coalition” which Montana’s spokespeople often refer to has shrunk considerably since their Accord was initially announced in August 2021. Labor unions and political parties have withdrawn support. It is unclear what fraction of the “civil society” organizations, unions, peasants groups, and human rights outfits which initially supported Montana continue to do so.

First, Fanmi Lavalas (FL) withdrew support for the BSA (Bureau de Suivi – the Montana Accord’s Monitoring Office, its governing body). They complained of factionalism in the selection process for the interim-elect President and Prime Minister.

Next, MOLEGHAF, an anti-imperialist popular organization withdrew support for the Montana Accord entirely. In a May 2022 interview with Haiti Liberté, MOLEGHAF’s leader Oxygène David explained that when they “left the Montana coalition, the union CNOH [National Confederation of Haitian Workers] left, and many popular organizations no longer recognize the Montana Accord.”

In David’s view, “the Montana Accord did nothing more than plunge the masses deeper into exclusion, poverty, and misery.” The leadership behind Montana “never believed in mass mobilization nor called for popular mobilization. Montana did nothing but put a brake on the popular mobilization. They have a wait-and-see attitude, waiting for the U.S. imperialists to give them a green-light and facilitate the political change they want.”

In an Aug. 1, 2022 press release, former senator Antonio Chéramy suggested Montana’s leadership drop the dialogue process with Washington and the PHTK because it was leading nowhere. Chéramy also proposed that BSA members convene all of the Montana Accord’s signatories to engage in mobilization movements capable of ousting Henry’s coalition.

Monique Clesca is a leading spokeswoman for the Montana Accord coalition.

Montana’s leadership does seem to have lost the support of major labor unions in Haiti. While these unions support the spirit of building a broad-based coalition, their January 2023 joint-declaration did not mention the Montana Accord.

Similarly, La plateforme d’organisations paysannes, a coalition of four peasants organizations named 4G Kontre (Four eyes meet), themselves signatories to the Montana Accord, pleaded with Montana’s leadership to complete negotiations with various groups in the coalition. In a January 2023 interview with Alterpresse, they argued this needed to organize “all types of mobilizations” demanding the “installation of a transitional government.”

Two weeks later, it was apparent 4G Kontre was exasperated with Montana’s leadership. In a Feb. 1, 2023 interview with Alterpresse, Chavannes Jean-Baptiste, a spokesperson for one of the peasants groups who make up 4G Kontre, said that, compared to Henry’s December 21 Accord, Montana has a “democratic basis.”

Nonetheless, Jean-Baptiste said “the most visible political protagonists are still unable to agree on an Accord between them.” He called for “a national awakening” that focused on “a major national dialogue, with a view to leading to a national agreement.”

Indicating that while 4G Kontre supported the initial coalition (Commission pour la Recherche d’une Solution Haïtienne à la Crise – CRSHC) and the Montana Accord, they had lost faith in Montana’s leadership.

These declarations, suggestions, and pleas seem to have been ignored by Fritz Alphonse Jean, Ted Saint Dic, Magali Comeau Denis, and other leaders in Montana’s two governing bodies – the BSA and CNT (National Transitional Council). They did refuse to continue negotiating with Henry. Rebuilding their coalition and building solidarity with the Haitian people, however, wasn’t in the cards.

As Prof. Chalmers Larose explained to Le Devoir in a recent interview, Montana’s “basic unity has been broken,” citing “tactical” differences between the members. Larose explained that the Montana “Accord has reached a phase of obsolescence.”

Other Haitian academics concur with this assessment. Speaking to Pascal Robert on the Mau Mau Hour podcast, Prof. Paul Mocombe commented that he does “not believe the Montana Accord represents the interests of the Haitian people.” Mocombe describes Montana leadership as a “group of technocrats who are looking to be in the good graces of the CORE group.”

While support for Montana’s leadership was crumbling in Haiti, interest abroad was growing.

By late 2022, U.S. think-tanks, diplomats, and journalists were actively promoting the Montana Accord as the best option for progress in Haiti, ignoring the reality that the coalition behind the Montana Accord had crumbled.

Montana’s rise in popularity in the West

Over the past 18 months, Montana’s popularity has increased among some in the halls of power outside Haiti, where it is seen as a preferable alternative to Henry’s lumbering and illegitimate rule.

Some prominent liberals and“Haiti watchers” in the U.S. and Canadian mainstream media view the Montana Accord as the best, or only, alternative to Henry. They seem unaware that Montana’s support has crumbled in Haiti.

Reporters like The Nation’s Amy Wilentz described the Montana Accord as “the Haitian Solution to the Crisis,” claiming the Accord’s coalition is a “vast network of Haitian organizations.” The Washington Post shared Wilentz’s enthusiastic support for Montana, suggesting that its leadership “deserve[s] a role in determining Haiti’s future; Washington could give them that.”

In Canada, Le Devoir’s Guy Taillefer argued that the Canadian government should support the Montana Accord, which he describes as a “broad coalition of political parties and civil society organizations.”

Consequently, while speaking on behalf of Montana, Jean is not challenged on the coalition’s current state. The narrative that Montana represents a current broad-consensus among Haitians is repeated over and over again, despite a lack of evidence.

Reporting on the Montana Accord’s popularity among Haitians has been scant over the past 18 months. The Haitian Times, for example, took over one year to publish a link to the text of the Accord itself. Coverage in the Haitian French language press provides few details and context for understanding the current state of Montana’s coalition, or the support this coalition has in Haiti and the diaspora. As one protestor at the Debout pour la Dignité demonstration explained: “It is not recognized by Haitians. It’s not going anywhere,” while another protestor said “I don’t even know what the Montana Accord is.”

Oxygène David of MOLEGHAF: “The Montana Accord did nothing more than plunge the masses deeper into exclusion, poverty, and misery.” Photo: Kim Ives/Haïti Liberté

Top U.S. diplomats have also chimed in on Montana. Former U.S. Ambassador to Haiti James Foley, who was actively involved in the 2004 coup against Aristide, claimed that the coalition behind Montana represents “an impressively broad spectrum of Haiti’s civil society” and a “singular hope for progress.”

Writing for the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Susan Page, who led MINUJUSTH, the UN’s last Chapter 7 mission in Haiti and MINUSTAH’s successor, wrote that the U.S. “should view the Montana Accord as the natural starting point for its new strategic approach for Haiti precisely because it is a Haitian-formulated agreement.” By supporting the Montana Accord, “the United States could rally other bilateral and international partners, many of whom are part of the Core Group, that wield enormous power and influence in the country, to work directly with Haitian civil society actors.”

Despite the enthusiasm in Western capitals, the editors at Le Nouvelliste, Haiti’s establishment daily newspaper, seem to understand Montana leadership’s role as controlled opposition. For a year-end retrospective in January 2023, it published a front page caricature depicting three sinister individuals stirring a cauldron filled with the bodies of dead Haitians.

The cauldron’s three stirrers are Ariel Henry, Magalie Comeau Denis, and Canadian ambassador to Haiti Sébastien Carrière.

The Canadian parliament’s standing committee report on the crisis in Haiti

Monique Clesca, another spokesperson for the Montana Accord, who has a background in diplomacy, recently spoke to a Canadian Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development. She was one of several guests including Renata Segura (Associate Director of Latin America and Caribbean, International Crisis Group or ICG), Chantale Ismé, Prof. Chalmers LaRose, Lecturer at the Royal Military College of Canada, and Gédéon Jean, the Chief Executive Officer of the Centre d’analyse et de recherche en droits de l’homme (CARDH).

The Standing Committee produced a report with 11 recommendations for the Canadian government’s policy towards Haiti. In a recent podcast, Yves Engler accurately describes these recommendations as “whitewashing Canadian imperialism in Haiti.” Aidan Jonah, Editor-in-Chief of The Canada Files, concurred in an analysis, while listing the ways Canada has undermined Haitian democracy.

Segura’s presence is significant. ICG is funded by George Soros’ Open Society Foundation, which also funds the RNDDH and FOKAL, Haitian organizations that actively supported the 2004 coup. They did so largely because the coup-supporting elites – including FOKAL’s then director Michèle Duvivier Pierre-Louis – also supported implementing neoliberal policies in Haiti. In contrast, the Fanmi Lavalas’ goals were to build infrastructure, raise the minimum wage, and focus on access to basic healthcare.

Clesca’s presence at the Standing Committee is also significant. Recommendation 10 states “that the Government of Canada support[s] Haitian civil society and its leadership in finding a way out of the crisis and an appropriate democratic governance model that will benefit the people of Haiti.” In other words, the Canadian government is leaving the door open to backing a Montana-led transitional government.

Recommendation 3 states “that the Government of Canada continue to work with international partners to strengthen the capacity of the Haitian National Police Force.”

This is in line with Henry’s coalition and Montana’s leadership, both of which publicly endorse the “support the PNH” intervention framework. They simply disagree on who ought to be in power when the help arrives.

Trudeau’s reticence to lead a “multinational special military force” into Haiti may look like a rejection of foreign intervention as a solution. Trudeau, however, is simply unwilling to lead this intervention. The Standing Committee’s report relieved some of the pressure Trudeau has felt on the international stage to do so, as Recommendation 11 states that Canada should promise that “it will not participate in direct engagement in military operations on the ground in Haiti by Canadian Armed Forces.” This provided Trudeau with an easy out.

Domestic politics are a factor too. Trudeau has a minority government that is maintained by a coalition with the New Democratic Party. The NDP is officially opposed to a military intervention, stating that a “militarized approach is neither sufficient nor sustainable.” The NDP is in favor of the Montana Accord as a legitimate transitional government for Haiti.

Trudeau’s track record shows that he is more likely to engage in policies that are largely performative, such as supporting a fascist coup in Bolivia and an unelected leader in Venezuela, or presenting Canada as a safe-haven for refugees, while deporting Haitians back to Haiti by the hundreds.

Trudeau’s lack of interest in leading an international force belies a fundamental agreement on U.S. policy towards Haiti. He simply understands an intervention of Haiti is a commitment to occupy Haiti and that would likely lead to a quagmire.

His preferred framework for an intervention into and occupation of Haiti is outlined in the U.S. Global Fragility Act.

The Global Fragility Act

Canada quietly endorsed the Global Fragility Act (GFA) in early 2020. A single statement by the Canadian Embassy in the United States stated that Canada “celebrated the passage” of the GFA. The statement goes on to explain that the GFA “aligns with a number of Government of Canada development and foreign policy priorities.”

As journalist Kim Ives noted in a recent article, “although the GFA was passed with bipartisan support under Trump in 2019, it has remained under the radar.” He explains, the GFA is “essentially a new alliance of USAID ‘know-how’ with Pentagon muscle.”

Frances Z. Brown, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, views the GFA’s “bilateral agreements with fragile states” as a way to prevent China and Russia from “preying upon weak governance.”

The Biden administration released “The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti” on Mar. 24, 2023, saying it had chosen Haiti for “its strategic relevance and proximity to the United States and the need for a more coordinated long-term approach to address drivers of instability in the country.”

To achieve this, the U.S. plans to “integrate U.S. diplomacy, development, and security-sector engagement in Haiti.” In other words, the State Department, its humanitarian arm, USAID, and the Pentagon will all work in close coordination.

Ives explains that “this means that the new DOS/USAID/DOD complex will effectively take over Haiti, if Washington gets its way, thereby returning the country from a neo-colony back into a virtual colony as it was from 1915 to 1934, when U.S. Marines occupied and ran it. Nonetheless, the U.S. would try to keep some Haitian window-dressing.”

Under the GFA, these “multi-year programs” are in fact ten-year “planned security assistance” programs.

In a prepared statement to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Jim Saenz, Deputy Assistant Secretary Defense for Counternarcotics and Stabilization Policy, explained that the Defense Department “will play a key role in planning and implementation” of the GFA. The “DoD’s role in GFA implementation is to support the efforts of the Department of State as the lead, and the USAID” to “ensure that the ten-year plans for the priority countries and regions align the relevant goals, objectives, plans, and benchmarks with DoD policy”, Saenz explained.

Unsurprisingly, Susan Page, the aforementioned ex-head of MINUJUSTH, endorsed the GFA, proposing in her piece for the CFR that “the United States and other partners should begin planning for multi-year development programs” with Montana leadership under the GFA.

The GFA’s broader context was explained when the act was rolled out. Frances Z. Brown, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, views the GFA’s “bilateral agreements with fragile states” as a way to prevent China and Russia from “preying upon weak governance,” reflecting the concern of many U.S. think tanks.

A successful “partnership” under the GFA between Haiti and Washington would ensure that Haiti remain under U.S. hegemony for decades. This would also block diplomacy and investment from countries like China which have, as recently as 2017, offered a $4.7 billion USD infrastructure project.

Washington is desperate to keep so-called “fragile states” like Haiti from developing diplomatic relationships with China and Russia and potentially joining in investment projects like the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, or BRICS.

Jovenel Moïse, who was assassinated two years ago, learned this lesson the hard way. Mired in corruption and increasingly isolated from Haiti’s oligarchs, Moïse established formal diplomatic relations with Moscow only one month before his assassination, accrediting Russian ambassador Sergey Melik-Bagdasarov. It was the first time Haiti had established diplomatic relations with Russia. Many argued that this could have been a factor which led Washington to green-light Moïse’s assassination.

Indeed, Washington has good reason to fear Haiti building diplomatic relations with Russia. It was common to see Haitians flying Russian flags in street protests over the past year. Haitian economist Boaz Anglade explains that Haitians see that “Putin has defied the West through the invasion of Ukraine and smell the advent of a new world order where no one country will be calling the shots.” In other words, a multipolar world may work in favor of Haitians. According to Anglade, “Haitians have been paying attention to global events and are sending a clear signal to the United States.”

This dynamic speaks directly to the class divide in Haiti. While sectors of Haiti’s bourgeoisie compete for approval, support, and funding from Washington, the Haitian lumpen proletariat and peasantry want to rid themselves of U.S. hegemonic rule. Haitians see the economic and social benefits of investments and trade deals with countries like Russia, China, and the BRICS generally.

Indeed, in a recent poll of Haitians, when asked who they would prefer to lead an intervention into Haiti, 44% of 2610 responses preferred Russia, compared to the United States at 19%. Canada’s favorability had dropped from 23% to 12%.

This is why Washington and the CORE group conspire to keep Haiti strait jacketed under U.S. hegemonic rule.

Manufacturing consent for the Global Fragility Act

Washington has been manufacturing consent through various National Endowment For Democracy (NED), USAID, and Open Society Foundation supported groups to nurture support for the GFA. NED-funded organizations such as Initiative de la Société Civile and OCAPH have endorsed the GFA.

Nou Pap Domi is a foundational member-organization of the Montana Accord coalition. One of its foremost members and spokespersons, Emmanuela Douyon, recently offered support for the GFA at a Dec. 15, 2022, Alliance for Peacebuilding conference.

Douyon previously worked for the National Democratic Institute (NDI), an arm of the NED, which in turn is funded by the U.S. State Department and USAID. Later, she received an NED grant to found Policité, a “think tank” that conducts surveys and offers consultation services.

Jeffsky Poincy, another analyst who spoke at the conference, said that he was “glad Haiti is part of the GFA.” Poincy is a program manager at Partners Global, a consultancy firm funded by the U.S. State Department, the Canadian government, the Open Society Foundation, and USAID.

Jeffsky Poincy, a program manager at Partners Global, said that he was “glad Haiti is part of the GFA.”

Naed Jasmin Desiré is another example of a leader of a U.S.-funded organization that backs U.S. foreign policy in Haiti. Desiré co-founded Kafou Lespwa (KL) with multi-millionaire Haitian investor Charles Clermont. According to a USAID report, Kafou Lespwa used USAID funds to launch KL, which relies on NED funding for annual operations. Kafou Lespwa brings together disparate sectors of Haiti’s political class to build a consensus on how to “emerge from the current crisis.”

Among the Haitian elites, politicians, and leaders on the Kafou Lespwa “team” are: Clifford Apaid, the son of oligarch Andy Apaid who led the Group of 184 organization; Abdonel Doudou, an NED fellow and head of Jurimedia in Haiti; Edgar Leblanc Fils, OPL’s general coordinator; Fritz Alphonse Jean, the Montana Accord’s proposed interim President; Joel “Pasha” Vorbe, who sits on the FL’s executive council; Liné Balthazar, the PHTK’s President; Pascales Solanges of Nou Pap Domi, and Paul Altidor, the former Haitian ambassador to the U.S..

A lawyer by trade, Desiré was also involved early on in the coalition behind the Montana Accord, eventually becoming a member of the BSA, led by Magalie Comeau Denis and Ted Saint Dic. Desiré eventually became the CNT Secretary.

While Desiré’s view on the GFA is unknown, her KL co-founder Charles Claremont endorsed the GFA when he spoke at a NED conference in July 2022.

Montana’s leaders have yet to publicly endorse the GFA. Their modus operandi – seeking support and approval from Washington while eschewing building diplomatic relationships with other governments, regional organizations, or international organizations – suggests they will eventually announce this support, likely when Montana takes over, or is integrated into, a transitional government.

Haitian political party speaks out against Global Fragility Act

Meanwhile, political parties inside Haiti are sounding the alarm on the GFA. OPL general coordinator Edgar LeBlanc Fils, a Montana Accord front-runner for the position of interim President, worries that de facto PM Ariel Henry will try to negotiate “security assistance” from the U.S. under the GFA.

The OPL is one of many political parties that initially supported the Montana Accord. Whether or not they maintain that support is unclear. The OPL is a signatory to the Accord. But recently, the party signed a declaration with seven other political parties, including UNIR, LAPEH, GREH, PHTK, MOPOD, and Platfòm Pitit Desalin. Most of the parties are listed as members of Montana’s CNT, including the PHTK. Their desire to publish a declaration on Jan. 30, 2023, separate from Montana, suggests waning support.

The declaration states that the signatories “renew their commitment to favor the higher interests of the country over personal or particular interests and ambitions linked to the conquest and exercise of power.” While opposition to Henry’s December 21 Accord is stated directly by signatories, support for Montana is absent from the declaration.

PHTK President Liné Balthazar actually distanced himself from Henry months ago. It is unclear whether this is simply political maneuvering or authentic opposition to Henry’s de facto rule. The PHTK’s joint-declaration with left-of-center political parties like Pitit Desalin and MOPOD is noteworthy.

An Apr. 24, 2023 open letter to the UN Security Council President signed by several political party and civil society organizations also called out the threat of the GFA. Signatories include the leaders Oxygène David of MOLEGHAF and Jean Hénold Buteau of Alternative Socialiste. Referring to the GFA, the letter asked the Security Council president, Russia’s Vasily Nebenzya (the position of President of the Security council rotates monthly between 15 member countries), whether the United States’ policy to “impose a ten-year plan” on Haiti, which is a “violation of the right to self-determination of the Haitian people” ought to be raised.

Political parties have reshuffled their alliances several times since Jovenel Moïse refused to step down at the end of his term on Feb. 7, 2021. Their lack of success is due in part to the political class’ inability to build solidarity with the population and mobilize Haitians.

Haitians are clearly unwilling to wait for the political class to defend them from the endemic, depraved violence of armed criminal gangs and the politicians and oligarchs who support them. Since late April, tens of thousands of Haitians have coalesced into a leaderless nationwide movement called the “Bwa Kale” which has pursued, confronted, apprehended, and killed over 100 criminal gang members.

(Part 3)


An earlier version of this article was first published by The Canada Files. Travis Ross is a teacher based in Montreal, Québec. He is also the co-editor of the Canada-Haiti Information Project at canada-haiti.ca . Travis has written for Haiti Liberté, Black Agenda Report, TruthOut, and rabble.ca. He can be reached on Twitter.

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