Haiti at a Crossroads (2)

(The second of three parts)

(Part 1)

This is the second installment of an IJDH report seeking to put the current crisis in Haiti into context by explaining the short-, medium- and long-term factors driving the unrest, including detailing some of the gravest human rights violations in Haiti during President Moïse’s tenure.

III. Medium-term Factors

While the PetroCaribe scandal has served as a catalyst for the recent protests, the mobilization is also driven by a broader rejection of the Moïse administration’s governance. President Moïse has lacked a popular mandate from the start, and further alienated Haitians through economic mismanagement and violent abuses of authority.

A. Lack of Popular Mandate

Beyond the immediate triggers, Haiti’s political crisis can be traced back to the electoral process that brought President Moïse into power.⁵¹ President Moïse was elected in 2016 in the lowest voter turnout elections since the end of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986.⁵² The Presidential elections took place during a protracted election cycle characterized by widespread fraud and violence, much of it committed by President Moïse’s PHTK party and its allies.⁵³ Fraud in the first attempt at the Presidential elections forced a redo.⁵⁴ The second time only about 20% of the eligible population voted due to a combination of disenfranchisement and disillusionment with the electoral system.⁵⁵ President Moïse received only 600,000 votes in a country of 10 million.⁵⁶

Haiti’s political crisis can be traced back to the electoral process that brought President Moïse into power.

The electoral machinations of President Moïse and his party put him in Haiti’s National Palace, but without much popular support. Without a popular mandate to govern, President Moïse and his appointees have instead relied on a patronage network to support them.⁵⁷ In order to maintain this network of supporters, the government diverts funds from the treasury and from social programs, resulting in further economic problems for an already-impoverished country.⁵⁸ President Moïse has been accused of prioritizing the wishes of the powerful rather than policies to support the masses and has turned to repression to consolidate power, in turn spurring further protests.⁵⁹

B. Economic Mismanagement

The current protest movement is also a response to the Moïse administration’s grave economic mismanagement, which has had devastating consequences for the majority of Haitians who are poor. In order to feed its patronage machine, the administration has both borrowed and printed substantial sums of money, leading to a record deficit, extreme inflation, and sharp currency depreciation.⁶⁰ The government’s budget deficit has grown to a record $89.6 million since October, and the national budget is nine months late.⁶¹ The Haitian gourde has lost 37% of its value in the last year, and in February inflation reached 17% after years in double digits.⁶²

The Moïse administration’s mismanagement has also hampered the release of international development assistance. For example, due to a flawed negotiation of a multi-billion dollar Toussaint-Louverture airport revitalization project agreement with the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China that violated the regulations on interest rates imposed by the IMF and World Bank, the Haitian government has been forced to abandon the project and has failed to recoup $42 million already invested in it.⁶³ Furthermore, the Inter-American Development Bank decided to suspend the disbursement of a $41 million grant for the construction of buildings to expand the Caracol Industrial Park because of management problems including safety, security, and the high price of electricity.⁶⁴ Moreover, the IMF agreement with the Haitian Government of a three-year loan of US$ 229 million negotiated in March is currently on hold and has not yet been put before the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision due to the current political situation in Haiti and the government’s failure to introduce its budget.⁶⁵ Meanwhile, the Haitian government’s absence in major international conversations regarding the country’s development has stifled international investment. For example, in February 2018, the Haitian government canceled its participation in a UN high-level donor retreat regarding infrastructure to address the ongoing cholera epidemic in protest of a United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) statement that welcomed the assignment of investigative judges in the PetroCaribe court cases.⁶⁶

As a result of the economic mismanagement, millions of Haitians who were living on the edge of desperation have fallen off that edge in recent years. Families cannot eat, send their children to school, or access the most basic healthcare.⁶⁷ The country’s economic malaise has even started reaching the middle and upper classes of society.⁶⁸ Outside of Haiti, the U.S. Government’s termination of Temporary Protected Status for Haitians in the United States has threatened to return 50,000 people to Haiti⁶⁹ and put an end to remittances that support an estimated 250,000 family members in Haiti.⁷⁰ Remittances from abroad makes up 25% of Haiti’s national income.⁷¹ The desperate economic situation further explains why the PetroCaribe corruption scandal has triggered such a mass mobilization.

C. Impunity for Human Rights Abuses

President Moïse’s implication in human rights violations, direct misuse of state institutions for his personal interest, and inadequate responses to abuses by others have further eroded confidence in his leadership, and have intensified the current crisis. President Moïse oversees a government responsible for grave human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, violent evictions, and police abuses. The state-sponsored violence has targeted the poor and vulnerable, and has been used to suppress the opposition movement and consolidate power for President Moïse. Abuses have largely been carried out with impunity, and victims have been unable to obtain legal recourse in violation of their rights. The Moïse administration has responded to brutal rights violations with silence in Haiti, while vehemently rejecting concerns from abroad. President Moïse pushed out the UN’s chief officer in Haiti in 2018 after she spoke out on corruption, and more recently, the administration responded publicly to a March 2019 letter from 104 members of the U.S. Congress stating that it “categorically denies all allegations of human rights violations.”⁷² The following examples illustrate both the government’s rights abuses and impunity:

La Saline Massacre

On Nov. 13, 2018, in the days leading up to long-planned nationwide protests, armed gangs carried out a brutal government-sanctioned massacre in La Saline, a longtime convening spot for anti-government protests.⁷³ Assailants killed at least 71 people, including women and children, raped at least 11 women, and looted more than 150 homes, making this one of Haiti’s worst massacres since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986.⁷⁴ The assailants allegedly went house-to-house with long guns and machetes, pulled unarmed civilians into the alleys and killed them with single shots or machete blows.⁷⁵ Most bodies were burned or disposed in trash piles and fed to pigs.⁷⁶ Images of the aftermath circulated on social media and shook the nation. Following the massacre, approximately 300 people fled La Saline, and at the time of writing, dozens of families are still living in a makeshift camp across from the Parliament without any government support.⁷⁷

Investigations by rights groups, including the National Human Rights Defense Network (RNDDH), concluded that the La Saline massacre was perpetrated by gangs operating with the support and involvement of government forces.⁷⁸ Witnesses reported that perpetrators were transported to the areas in police vehicles, and that some wore official police uniforms.⁷⁹ La Saline residents also implicated government officials in orchestrating the massacre, claiming the attack was organized to retaliate against the neighborhood’s involvement in the anti-government protests that had been planned for Nov. 18.⁸⁰ A Galil automatic rifle used by a gang in the assault was traced to Haiti’s National Palace.⁸¹

Despite the scale and horror of the atrocities, President Moïse has not formally condemned the killings and victims have not been provided protection or support.⁸² A declaration signed by a diverse group of civil society groups calling for an independent investigation and protection and remedies for victims has gone unanswered.⁸³ Following a lengthy investigation, the judicial police (DCPJ) released a report in May that recommends the arrest of 70 people in connection  with the massacre.⁸⁴ The list includes two senior government officials: Joseph Pierre Richard Duplan, President Moïse’s representative for the West region that includes La Saline, and Fednel Monchéry, the Director-General of the Interior Ministry, who are accused of supporting two gang leaders in the planning of the massacre.⁸⁵ Accounts differ as to how many arrests have been made in the case.⁸⁶ MINUJUSTH is also conducting its own investigation, but as of May 2019, it has not released any findings.⁸⁷

In the meantime, La Saline and other poor neighborhoods that are centers of anti-government organizing continue to suffer attacks by gangs associated with the government.⁸⁸ On May 7, seven human rights organizations denounced a reported plan to assassinate RNDDH Executive Director Pierre Espérance, in retaliation for RNDDH’s work on the La Saline massacre.⁸⁹

Use of Police to Repress Protesters

Reports indicate that President Moïse has attempted to directly and improperly control Haitian National Police (HNP) units. Human rights groups have criticized the widespread deployment of Palace Security Units, which are supposed to be restricted to the Palace grounds and the President’s vicinity.⁹⁰ In the days preceding the Oct. 17, 2018 protests, President Moïse personally visited HNP stations around Port-au-Prince without top leadership present, and reportedly handed out envelopes with cash to officers, encouraging them to take action to quell the protests.⁹¹ Meanwhile, UN investigations found the police responsible for 57 human rights violations during the October protests, including three summary executions and 47 cases of excessive use of force.⁹² In the subsequent November 2018 protests, the UN recorded another six deaths and 21 injuries at the hands of police.⁹³

Human rights groups fear that the army’s revival is intended to provide the President with another tool to limit political dissent.

Human rights groups fear that the government’s increasingly-rapid revival of the notoriously brutal Forces Armées d’Haïti (FADH), which was disbanded in 1995 after a long history of involvement in coups, violent repression, and drug trafficking, is intended to provide the President with another tool to limit political dissent. President Moïse formally announced the re-establishment of the FADH in November 2017. ⁹⁴ He appointed a High Command in March 2018, comprised of majors or colonels in the former FADH.⁹⁵ In January, 2019, the army opened its training center, and in April it graduated its first class of 250 soldiers.⁹⁶

Violent Evictions in Pèlerin 5

In July 2018, government actors illegally and violently evicted families living in the area adjacent to President Moïse’s residence.⁹⁷ Following a request from the Director of the General Directorate of Taxes, the head prosecutor in Port-au-Prince sent illegal instructions to the HNP West Department Director to drive inhabitants of Pèlerin 5 away from the area by any means whatsoever.⁹⁸ Following this order, in the presence of 50 to 60 police officers, a tractor bearing the logo of the City Hall of Tabarre destroyed the homes of seven families.⁹⁹ The demolition of some of the houses took place at night, without any warning for the families inside the homes.¹⁰⁰ Twenty-two people, including 10 children, were rendered homeless.¹⁰¹ The government originally marked 36 homes for demolition¹⁰² and only abandoned the destruction when neighbors exited their homes and protested.¹⁰³ Those families living in marked homes continue to live in fear, not knowing if and when their homes will also be destroyed. Police also arrested one of the residents and his cousin during the demolition. The two were imprisoned and released the next day in the middle of the night. These arbitrary arrests and detentions, without a warrant and in the absence of judicial proceedings, amounted to further intimidation tactics against the residents of Pèlerin 5.

Victims’ representatives have filed complaints with the Chief Inspector of the HNP and the Superior Council of the Judiciary.¹⁰⁴ The head prosecutor who issued the destruction orders is a member of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, however, making a fair process unlikely. At the time of writing, none of the complaints filed have been acted on by Haitian authorities.

Grand Ravine Massacre

On Nov. 13, 2017, the Haitian National Police and MINUJUSTH carried out a joint anti-gang raid in Grand Ravine, an impoverished neighborhood of Port-au-Prince, that ended in the summary execution of at least nine civilians on a school campus.¹⁰⁵ The operation involved hundreds of police officers and was planned and executed jointly with MINUJUSTH to root out gang activity following months of increased violence.¹⁰⁶ Grand Ravine is known as a gang-controlled neighborhood of Port-au-Prince.¹⁰⁷ According to reports, the police sought to capture gang members hiding in a school when two police were shot.¹⁰⁸ Chaos ensued and civilians, including teachers at the school who tried to calm police, were beaten and shot point blank in the head.¹⁰⁹

Key government officials and institutions have avoided taking responsibility for the incident and no convictions have followed.¹¹⁰ The police Inspector General completed investigations in 2017 and passed them on to an investigative judge who has the authority to issue arrest warrants and question witnesses.¹¹¹ The Port-au-Prince police director, Alain Auguste, who ordered the operation, was replaced.¹¹² Families of nine victims, including those of the two police officers, received a one-time payment of about $1,500 for funeral expenses.¹¹³ But, over a year and a half later, despite assurances that penal sanctions would follow police investigations,¹¹⁴ no judicial measures have been taken to hold those involved accountable.¹¹⁵ An independent journalist, Vladimir Legagneur, who was investigating the killings, disappeared in Grand Ravine on Mar. 14, 2018.¹¹⁶ Mr. Legagneur is presumed dead.¹¹⁷ Following persistent calls for justice from international and local media groups, authorities arrested several individuals in connection with the disappearance.¹¹⁸ The UN has also evaded responsibility, denying direct involvement in the massacre.¹¹⁹ The UN spokeswoman, Sophie Boutaud de la Combe, claimed that “the reported civilian death[s] were not part of the planned operation but of a unilateral action conducted by some [Haitian police] officers after the conclusion of the operation.”¹²⁰

The international community, including the UN, have failed to meaningfully support calls for accountability for the Moïse Administration. In January 2017, MINUJUSTH issued a statement urging an investigation into the Grand Ravine massacre and welcoming the assignment of an investigative judge to the PetroCaribe case.¹²¹ The Foreign Minister responded by condemning the UN’s statements, and, in an attempt to demonstrate the UN’s lackluster efforts to tackle corruption, human rights abuses, and impunity in the country, President Moïse withdrew his ambassador to the UN and summoned the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Haiti to explain her comments.¹²² There was no apparent international support for the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Haiti against this attack, and she was promptly recalled and then replaced.¹²³ The UN has since largely refrained from speaking out against abuses.

(To be continued)

REFERENCES

51. Haiti and the Collapse of A Political and Economic System, Haitian Times, Feb. 12, 2019, https://haitiantimes.com/2019/02/12/haiti-and-the-collapse-of-a-political-and-economic-system/.
52. Jake Johnston, Breakdown of Preliminary Election Results in Haiti, Ctr. For Econ. & Policy Research (Dec. 6, 2016), http://cepr.net/blogs/haiti-relief-and-reconstruction-watch/breakdown-of- preliminary-election-results-in-haiti; NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 13 at 2.
53. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018 Haiti, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/haiti [hereinafter 2018 HAITI]; Carol Guensburg et al., Haiti’s Incoming President Foresees Personal Bond With Trump, VOICE OF AMERICA, Feb. 2, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/haitis-incoming-president-foresees-personal-bond-with-trump/3703234.html; NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 13 at 4-5.
54. FREEDOM HOUSE, 2018 HAITI, supra note 53; Jake Johnston, Haiti Election Primer, Part1: Timeline of Key Events, Haiti: Relief and Reconstruction Watch Blog, Nov. 15, 2016, http://haitielection2015.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2016-11-17T11:43:00-05:00&max-results=10; Guensburg et al., supra note 53.
55. Nat’l Lawyers Guild, supra note 13, at 9.
56. Id at 9.
57. See Frances Robles, Haiti’s Violent Politics Are Taken to Court. In Boston., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/01/world/americas/haiti-politics-violence.html; Jake Johnston, Haiti’s Eroding Democracy, JACOBIN, Feb. 2017, available at https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/02/haiti-election-democracy-neoliberal-clinton-jovenel-moise-martelly-aristide-preval-duvalier/ [hereinafter Haiti’s Eroding Democracy] (analyzing Haiti’s general system of patronage).
58. Haiti ranks 161 or 180 in Transparency International’s 2018 Global Corruption index. Transparency Int’l, Country Profiles, Haiti, (last visited Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.transparency.org/country/HTI. See also Haiti’s Eroding Democracy, supra note 57.
59. Greg Becket, Haiti at the Crossroads, NACLA, Mar. 6, 2019, https://nacla.org/news/2019/03/06/haiti-crossroads
60. Jacqueline Charles, It’s Been 33 Years Since Haiti Welcomed Democracy. How did It Mark the Day? Protests, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 7, 2019, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article225931055.html [hereinafter 33 Years].
61. Jacqueline Charles and Franco Ordoñez, U.S. Looks to Send Food Aid to Haiti as Violence Brews Humanitarian Crisis, Miami Herald, Feb. 15, 2019, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article226350490.html; Charles, 33 Years, supra note 60, at para. 11.
62. New Record, Inflation Accelerates and Reaches 17% in February 2019, HAITI LIBRE, Mar. 25, 2019, https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-27278-haiti-economy-new-record-inflation-accelerates-and-reaches-17-in-february-2019.html.
63. Les 42 Millions de Dollars ne sont Toujours pas Récupérés, Le Nouvelliste, Apr. 1, 2019, https://lenouvelliste.com/article/199855/les-42-millions-de-dollars-ne-sont-toujours-pas-recuperes.
64. Rosny Ladouceur, Suspension d’un don de 41 Millions de Dollars de BID à Haïti, LOOP NEWS, Apr. 2, 2019, http://www.loophaiti.com/content/bid-sursoit-un-don-de-41-millions-pour-lexpansion-du-parc-caracol.
65. Press Release, International Monetary Fund, IMF Staff Completes 2019 Article IV Mission to Haiti and Reaches Staff-Level Agreement on Three-year US$ 229 million Extended Credit Facility (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/03/08/pr1970-haiti-imf-staff-completes-2019-article-iv-mission-and-reaches-staff-level-agreement; International Monetary Fund, Transcript of IMF Press Briefing (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/03/21/tr032119-transcript-of-imf-press-briefing.
66. Jacqueline Charles, Haiti U.N. Protest Continues as Government Cancels Participation in Cholera Meeting, Miami Herald, Feb. 22, 2018, available at https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article202768354.html.
67. See e.g., Jacqueline Charles, For Haitians, a Reprieve from Violence and Protests on Sunday, but Uncertainty Remains, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 17, 2019, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article226369690.html; Haiti, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (last visited Apr. 17, 2019), https://www1.wfp.org/countries/haiti.
68. Jake Johnston, Petrocaribe Protests : What You Need to Know Before October 17, Ctr. For Econ. & Policy Research (Oct. 16, 2018), http://cepr.net/blogs/haiti-relief-and-reconstruction-watch/petrocaribe-protests-what-you-need-to-know-before-october-17 [hereinafter Petrocaribe Protests].
69. In April 2019, a preliminary injunction was issued following a full trial in Saget v. Trump, enjoining the termination of TPS for an unspecified period. No. 18-1599, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63773 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2019. This adds to a prior preliminary injunction issued in Ramos v. Nielsen, which has delayed the termination of TPS until at least January 2020. At the time of writing, other lawsuits challenging the lawfulness of the TPS termination were pending in court. 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
70. Global Justice Clinic, N.y.u. Sch. Of Law, Extraordinary Conditions: a Statutory Analysis of Haiti’s Qualification for TPS 16 (2017), available at https://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/171025_Global-Justice-Clinic-Haiti-TPS-Report-web-version.pdf.
71. Manuel Orozco, Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean in 2016 (FEB. 10 2017), http://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Remittances-2016-FINAL-DRAFT.pdf.
72. Press Release, Embassy of Haiti to the United States, Allegations of Human Rights Violations by Congress of the United States (Mar 28, 2019), http://www.haiti.org/allegations-of-human-rights-violations-by-congress-of-the-united-states/.
73. Michael Weissenstein, Witnesses: Men in Police Garb Massacred Civilians in Haiti, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 16, 2019, https://apnews.com/d99258d01cce4b84a01e04b4eaff7236; Alexandra Panaguli, TPS: Trump is Also Erecting an Administrative Wall, HAITI LIBERTE, Jan. 16, 2019, https://haitiliberte.com/tps-trump-is-also-erecting-an-administrative-wall/.
74. Press Release, Reseau National Défense des Droits Humains, Massacre d’Etat a? La Saline: Révision a? la Hausse du Bilan des Personnes Tuées et Violées le 13 Novembre 2018 (Dec. 20, 2018), http://rnddh.org/content/uploads/2018/12/8-CP-La-Saline-bilan-r%C3%A9vis%C3%A9-20Dec2018.pdf; Margaret Prescod, La Saline Haiti Speaks Out Against Poverty and State Violence, KPFK RADIO (Apr. 5, 2019), https://soundcloud.com/sojournertruthradio/sojourner-truth-radio-april-5.
75. Weissenstein, supra note 73, at para. 3.
76. Id.
77. Port-au-Prince Slum Exemplifies Dire Problems of Crisis-Racked Haiti, AGENCIA EFE, Feb. 22, 2019, https://www.efe.com/efe/english/life/port-au-prince-slum-exemplifies-dire-problems-of-crisis-racked-haiti/50000263-3905852; Michelson Césaire, La Place d’Italie, un Refuge des Déplacés de La Saline, LE NOUVELLISTE, Mar. 29, 2019, https://www.lenouvelliste.com/article/199489/la-place-ditalie-un-refuge-des-deplaces-de-la-saline.
78. Reseau National Defense Des Droits Humains, the Events in La Saline: from Power Struggle Between Armed Gangs to State-sanctioned Massacre (2018), http://rnddh.org/content/uploads/2018/12/10-Rap-La-Saline-1Dec2018-Ang1.pdf; see also Randall White, Haiti Government Complicit in La Saline Massacre, HAITIACTION.NET (Dec. 4, 2018), http://www.haitiaction.net/News/RAW/12_4_18/12_4_18.html; Press Release, Human Rights Delegation Condemns Political Massacres Tied to Haiti’s Government (May 8, 2019), http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/DelegationPressReleaseFinal5-08-2.pdf (U.S. human rights delegation concluding that “the months-long series of attacks in poor neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince … were perpetrated by police and gangs associated with Haiti’s government, and were done to punish neighborhood residents-many of whom identify as supporters of the Fanmi Lavalas party-for playing a leading role in a series of demonstrations opposing government corruption, mismanagement and brutality.”
79. White, supra note 78.
80. RNDDH, supra note 78.
81. Un fusil d’assaut Galil doté au palais national retrouvé en possession d’un gang indexé dans le massacre de La Saline…,LE NOUVELLISTE, May 9, 2019, https://lenouvelliste.com/article/201573/un-fusil-dassaut-galil-dote-au-palais-national-retrouve-en-possession-dun-gang-indexe-dans-le-massacre-de-la-saline.
82. Weissenstein, supra note 73, at para. 10; Press Release, Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.ijdh.org/2019/01/projects/bai-call-for-independent-investigation-in-la-saline-massacre-2/.
83. Dwa Pou Moun Viv Pa Konn Kanpe! Deklarasyon La Salin (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.ijdh.org/2019/01/projects/deklarasyon-la-saline-dwa-pou-moun-viv-pa-konn-kanpe/.
84. See Jacqueline Charles, Haiti Police on La Saline Massacre: ‘Even young children were not spared’, MIAMI HERALD, May 15, 2019, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article230380739.html [hereinafter Haiti Police on La Saline]. The list corresponds closely with the individuals identified in the RNDDH report released in December 2018. RNDDH, supra note 78.
85. Haiti Police on La Saline, supra note 84; Haïti : Deux hauts responsables de l’État dans le collimateur de la justice, Vant Bèf Info, May 8, 2019, https://www.vantbefinfo.com/haiti-deux-hauts-responsables-de-letat-dans-le-collimateur-de-la-justice/.
86. A UN report from March 1, 2019 notes 19 arrests have been made in this case, but the prosecutor announced in May that 11 arrests had been made. Compare U.N. Secretary-General 2019 report, supra note 3, with Massacre of La Saline: DCPJ Investigation Implicates 2 high officials, ICIHAITI.COM (May 9, 2019), https://www.icihaiti.com/en/news-27679-icihaiti-massacre-of-la-saline-dcpj-investigation-implicates-2-high-officials-of-the-state.html. It is unclear how these numbers correspond with the DCPJ list and whether further arrests have been made since the DCPJ list release. See Godson Lubrun, Massacre La Saline : La DCPJ exige du parquet de Port-au-Prince l’arrestation de plusieurs hauts responsables de l’Etat, HPN, May 8, 2019, http://www.hpnhaiti.com/nouvelles/index.php/politique/36-space/5506-massacre-la-saline-la-dcpj-exige-du-parquet-de-port-au-prince-l-arrestation-de-plusieurs-hauts-responsables-de-l-etat.

87. See Haiti Police on La Saline, supra note 84; U.N. Secretary-General 2019 report, supra note 3.
88. Margaret Prescod, Reflections on Haiti, Chicano Poetry by Ron Baca, SOJOURNER TRUTH RADIO (Apr. 9, 2019), https://soundcloud.com/sojournertruthradio/sojourner-truth-radio-april-9; Margaret Prescod, Special Report: Massacres in Haiti – Pacifica’s Margaret Prescod (1/2), REAL NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 14, 2019), https://therealnews.com/stories/special-report-massacres-in-haiti-pacificas-margaret-prescod.
89. Des organisations des droits humains et de la société civile dénoncent un «plan d’assassinat» contre Pierre Espérance, LE NOUVELLISTE, May 7, 2019, https://lenouvelliste.com/article/201468/des-organisations-des-droits-humains-et-de-la-societe-civile-denoncent-un-plan-dassassinat-contre-pierre-esperance.
90. Marie Laurette Numa, Le Directeur Général de la PNH Clarifie, HAITI LIBERTE, Nov. 21, 2018, https://haitiliberte.com/le-directeur-general-de-la-pnh-clarifie/; Jacqueline Charles, Haiti Police Outgunned by Armed Gangs, Illegal Guns as U.N. Debates its Future Presence, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 12, 2018, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article222945290.html [hereinafter Haiti Police Outgunned].
91. Haiti-Andrésol dénonce les visites de Jovenel Moise dans les commissariats et les distributions d’argent, INSTANT INFO, Oct 15, 2018, https://www.instantinfo.fr/haiti-andresol-denonce-les-visites-de-jovenel-moise-dans-les-commissariats-et-les-distributions-dargent/; Johnston, Petrocaribe Protests, supra note 68.
92. U.N. Secretary-General 2019 report, supra note 3, para. 37.
93. Id.
94. Freedom House, 2018 Haiti, supra note 53; Andres Martinez Casares, Haitian Army Set to Make Controversial Return after Two Decades, REUTERS, Nov. 18, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-military/haitian-army-set-to-make-controversial-return-after-two-decades-idUSKBN1DJ01M.
95. Jake Johnston, Meet the New Haitian Military ? It’s Starting to Look a Lot Like the Old One, Ctr. For Econ. & Policy Research, Mar. 16, 2018, http://cepr.net/blogs/haiti-relief-and-reconstruction-watch/meet-the-new-haitian-military-it-s-starting-to-look-a-lot-like-the-old-one.
96. Robenson Geffrard, supra note 35; 500 New Haitian Army Soldiers To Start Basic Training January 2019, L’UNION SUITE (Dec. 2018), https://www.lunionsuite.com/haitian-army-soldiers-training-january/.
97. Woody Duffault, Pèlerin 5 : le Bureau des Avocats Internationaux va Porter Plainte contre les Autorités, LE NOUVELLISTE, July 19, 2018, https://lenouvelliste.com/article/190311/pelerin-5-le-bureau-des-avocats-internationaux-va-porter-plainte-contre-les-autorites.
98. Demande de Mesures Provisoires pour les Requérants … et … de Pèlerin 5, au nom de leur communauté, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R, (filed Feb. 20, 2019), http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Pelerin-5-Demande-de-mesures-provisoires-Feb-20-2019-client-info-deleted-redacted.pdf; Danio Darius, Il ne peut pas y avoir de déguerpissement sans une décision de justice, LE NOUVELLISTE, July 5, 2018, https://lenouvelliste.com/article/189777/il-ne-peut-pas-y-avoir-de-deguerpissement-sans-une-decision-de-justice.
99. Demande de Mesures Provisoires, at paras. 15, 26.
100. Id. at para. 3.
101. Id. at para. 44.
102. Id. at para. 12.
103. Id. at para. 16.
104. Id. at paras. 47-48.
105. Jake Johnston, A U.N.-Backed Police Force Carried Out a Massacre in Haiti. The Killings Have Been Almost Entirely Ignored, THE INTERCEPT, Jan. 10, 2018, https://theintercept.com/2018/01/10/haiti-raid-united-nations-police-grand-ravine/ [hereinafter U.N.-Backed Police Force].
106. Id.
107. Jacqueline Charles, Haiti Police Find Partial Human Remains in Area Where Journalist Disappeared, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 29, 2018, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article207261354.html [hereinafter Haiti Police Find].
108. Johnston, U.N.-Backed Police Force, supra note 105.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.; U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, U.N. Doc S/2018/241 (Mar. 20, 2018), https://undocs.org/en/S/2018/241 [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General 2018 Report].
112. Haiti Police Find, supra note 107.
113. Johnston, U.N.-Backed Police Force, supra note 105.
114. In November, 2017, a week following the incident, the Prime Minister said investigations were ongoing and the Chief of Police assured that penal sanctions would follow « Ces mesures administratives seront suivies de sanctions pénales, assure le chef de la police. » See Samuel Celiné, Bavure Policière à Grand-Ravine: La Division au Sein de la PNH a Encore Fappé, LE NOUVELLISTE, Nov. 20, 2017, https://lenouvelliste.com/article/179239/bavure-policiere-a-grand-ravine-la-division-au-sein-de-la-pnh-a-encore-frappe.
115. U.N. Secretary-General 2019 Report, supra note 3; U.N. Secretary-General 2018 Report, supra note 113.
116. Haiti police fear the worst in search for missing journalist, FRANCE 24, (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.france24.com/en/20180326-haiti-police-fear-worst-search-missing-journalist; Haiti Photojournalist Missing in Port-au-Prince, Comm. To Protect Journalists, Mar. 28, 2018, https://cpj.org/2018/03/haitian-photojournalist-missing-in-port-au-prince.php.
117. Gary Allen, Statement from CBU President to Mark Press Freedom Day, NATION NEWS, Mar. 28, 2018, http://www.nationnews.com/nationnews/news/153926/gary-allen-mark-world-press-freedom-day.
118. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 11.
119. Johnston, U.N.-Backed Police Force, supra note 105.
120. Id.
121. Johnston, Haitian Government on the Defensive, supra note 24.
122. Id. at para. 4.; Pierre Kiroul, Poigne de la MINUJUSTH et Indignation Gouvernementale!, HAITI LIBERTE, Feb. 28, 2018, https://haitiliberte.com/poigne-de-la-minujusth-et-indignation-gouvernementale/; Diplomatie: L’Ambassadeur d’Haiti aux Nations-Unies Rappelé Suite à un Communiqué de la Minujusth, VANT BEF INFO (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.vantbefinfo.com/cooperation-helen-meagher-la-lime-succede-a-suzan-page/.
123. Haiti MINUJUSTH – Helen Meagher La Lime replaces Susan D. Page as special representative, Haiti Politique – Haitian Politics, BELPOLITIK.COM (Sept. 17, 2018), http://www.belpolitik.com/blog/haiti-minujusth-has-a-new-leader-helen-meagher-la-lime.html.